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FUEHRER DIRECTIVES

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Name
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AND OTHER
TOP-LEVEL DIRECTIVES
OF THE

GERMAN ARMED FORCES

1939 - 1941

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16 SEP 1948
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Foreword

This office has undertaken to present in translation the top-level directives issued by Hitler and by the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) from 1939 through 1945. The present volume covers 1939 through 1941. A volume covering 1942 through 1945 will appear shortly. In a few cases it was possible to include top-level naval directives (OKM) showing the Navy's reaction. In the beginning of the war Hitler's important directives were numbered up through 51, and a special effort was made to include all of these. However, as far as could be ascertained by this office, numbers 10 and 12 were not filled, number 49 was definitely not issued, and number 32 was issued only in unsigned draft form.

As the war progressed, the initiative was taken from Germany, and Hitler more and more took over direct command in the field, he tended to issue large numbers of orders for day to day action. The top-level character of these is no longer as clearly defined and it is more difficult to make a selection from the mass of material available.

Undoubtedly other directives and orders could have been added to the list, but for technical reasons it was felt advisable to keep the collection within the present limits. It should also be noted that there were often corrections and additions to the directives. While these were included whenever they were found, no doubt there are others. Likewise a number of directives referred to in this collection could not be located.

Except when otherwise indicated the references given in the table of contents denote the microfilm reels and sections thereof on which the documents may be found in the microfilm library of Naval Records and Library. Where WD numbers appear, the originals can be found in the German Military Document Section of the Department of the Army.

Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy 1939-1945 and the volumes of the Naval Staff War Diary, Part A translated by this office, the Fuehrer Directives should provide valuable material for the study of problems arising from total war.

Washington, D.C.
1948

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[redacted]

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 3 Apr. 1939

WFA Nr. 37/39 g.Kdos. Chefs. L Ia — No. 2 of five copies

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Re: Directive for the Armed Forces 1939-40

The "Directive for Unified War Preparations by the Armed Forces for 1939-40" is being reissued.

Part I ("Border Defense") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. They are basically unchanged.

Part II ("Operation Weiss") is appended hereto.

The Fuehrer has ordered the following in connection with operation "Weiss":

1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time after 1 Sep. 1939.

2. The Armed Forces High Command is authorized to draw up an exact schedule for operation "Weiss" and to clarify the coordination of time between the three branches of the Armed Forces.

3. The plans of the three branches and information about the schedule should be submitted to the Armed Forces High Command by 1 May 1939.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin 11 Apr. 1939

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Directive for Unified War Preparations by the Armed Forces for 1939-40

I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the resulting preparations for warfare.

Until this directive becomes effective, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:

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I. Defense of the borders of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks (see Annex I).

II. Operation "Weiss" (see Annex II).

III. Occupation of Danzig (see Annex III).

Annex IV defines command authority in East Prussia in case of a warlike entanglement.

signed: Adolf Hitler

Annex I to

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I.

Defense of the Borders of the German Reich and Defense against Surprise Air Attacks

1. The Armed Forces must at all times be in a position speedily to safeguard the borders and the lebensraum of the German Reich. Preparations for this purpose must be made in such a way that border and air defense can if necessary become effective also without general mobilization either for the entire area or for some part of it.

The following code words will obtain:

"Border Defense" or
"Border Defense West" (France, Belgium, Holland) or
"Border Defense East" (Poland, Lithuania) or
"Border Defense East or West without...." (e.g., without Lithuania)

The focal point for preparations for border defense and air defense is in the west.

2. The following tasks obtain for the branches of the Armed Forces:

A. Army

The "Border Defense" is to be assured by troops near the border which are quickly available. In addition, in the West stronger forces are to be prepared for the defense of the border fortifications.

The other forces, especially the motorized units, are to be kept in readiness in such a way that they can be used, depending on the develop-

ment of the situation.

For "Border Defense East" smaller forces are to be provided.

The Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (V.G.A.D.) is sufficient for the other borders.

It is particularly urgent to expand the western fortifications into permanent installations which can be held even against attackers which are three or four times superior. For this purpose it is indispensible to build additional strong fortifications. Secondly, the fortifications in the East are to be finished and are to be advanced to the Polish frontier south of the Oder-Warthe bend.

B. Navy

It must at all times be possible to defend and patrol the German coastal areas with active naval forces and naval air forces. The scope and method can be decided only on the basis of the political situation prevailing at the given time.

C. Air Force

Defenses against surprise air attacks should be set up at first in the vicinity of the peacetime bases.

If strong Army forces advance to the frontiers, their protection, especially against air reconnaissance, must be assured.

The bulk of the offensive air forces is to be held in readiness at the peacetime bases, and preparations for their use should be made according to the prevailing situation.

Supplement to Annex I to OKW Nr. 37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L I of 11 Apr. 1939 (Translator's note: issued by Keitel on 11 May 1939)

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Special Regulations for "Border Defense"

1. Issuance of orders

The order for carrying out border defense measures will be issued by the Armed Forces High Command. The extent of the measures will depend on the situation.

Only in case of a sudden enemy attack should the responsible local commanders order the necessary measures independently to the extent required.

2. Legal basis

It is to be assumed that a state of defense or war, as defined by the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sep. 1938, will not be declared. All actions and demands for mobilization are to be based on peacetime laws.

3. Mobilization

Depending on the situation, the Supreme Commander will decide whether, independent of advance preparations, full or partial mobilization will affect the Armed Forces alone, or also the armament industry and the civilian population.

4. Operations area

During the execution of border defense measures, the area in question will become the operations area.

In this operations area the Commander in Chief, Army will receive command authority by special order according to the principles laid down in the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sep. 1938. He can delegate this authority entirely or in part to the Army commanders.

5. The Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (V.G.A.D.), the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service, Coastal, and the Frontier Guard (Grenzwacht)

The Armed Forces High Command will issue orders for organizing the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Services and the Frontier Guard when necessary.

6. Authority of the Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air in questions of air defense

The command authority delegated to the Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air according to OKW Nr. 2230/38 g.K. WFA/L II of 27 Sep. 1938, Section III in the event of mobilization or X case can become effective in a period of tension by order of the Supreme Commander.

7. Evacuation of border areas

All measures in this respect are subject to the approval of the Armed Forces High Command.

In the West evacuation of the red zone opposite the Luxemburg and French frontier must be considered first.

In the East evacuation is of lesser concern. The main thing is to set up an organization to receive refugees.

8. Evacuation and quartering of population as protection against air attacks

When population must be evacuated and quartered and other measures taken (evacuation of schools, public buildings, hospitals, etc.) as protection against air attacks, as provided in mobilization or X case, these measures are to be determined and dates set by the Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air, in cooperation with the responsible military and civilian authorities. Armed Forces High Command approval is needed to carry out such measures in periods of tension.

9. Command authority

Depending on the situation, the Commanders in Chief will be responsible for the following forces entirely or in part:

a. The Commander in Chief, Army

The Air Force units assigned for the various eventualities.

The SS Special Employment Units (SS Verfuegungstruppe) according to OKW Nr. 1750/38 g.K. WFA/L II of 28 Aug. 1938.

To begin with the police forces provided by the mobilization regulations.

The parts of the Reich Labor Service designated in Special Annex 7 of the Army Mobilization Plan.

b. The Commander in Chief, Navy

The naval air forces.

The parts of the Reich Labor Service provided by the mobilization regulations.

c. The Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air

The parts of the Reich Labor Service designated in Special Annex 3 of the Air Force Mobilization Plan.

The Army units intended as airborne troops as requested by the Commander in Chief, Air.

10. Surveillance and interruption of communications at land and sea frontiers and discontinuance of rail, air, and ship traffic

The necessary measures will be prepared by the Armed Forces High Command with the various branches of the Armed Forces so that they may be applied, depending on the situation, at all frontiers (including the coast) or against individual foreign countries. Detailed regulations will follow.

11. Communications

OKW Nr. 1050/39 g.K. WFA/L IIe of 10 May 1939 obtains for Armed Forces communications in the operations area.

Armed Forces High Command approval must be obtained by the branches of the Armed Forces for blocking communications both private and public, except where such action is caused by combat operations or evacuation of border areas.

The Armed Forces High Command will order the time when the wartime radio regulations will go into effect, depending on the situation.

A change in our entire radio setup must not at first become apparent to the enemy radio intercept service. Therefore peacetime radio activity of the branches of the Armed Forces should be maintained until the beginning of operations. Further deceptive measures becoming necessary will be ordered by the branches of the Armed Forces.

Measures for disrupting non-military enemy broadcasts will be ordered by the Armed Forces High Command.

Operational radio intelligence is left to the branches of the Armed Forces, and should **be put on a wartime basis at an early date. No special** measures by the Armed Forces High Command are planned in this regard for the time being.

12. Supplies

The troops will be supplied in accordance with the laws and regulations

in effect for the Reich area for peacetime.

13. Pay and rations

The troops involved receive additional pay and rations according to Supplement 4 of Army Regulations 159 (H Dv). The Armed Forces High Command will determine to which units this will apply.

14. Entry of additional costs

Additional costs caused by "Border Defense" are to be booked definitely as expenditures under VIII E 230 (Armed Forces High Command budget) which was set up for this purpose.

Annex II to

OKW Nr. 37/39 g.K.Chefs. L I No. 2 of five copies

II.

Operation "Weiss"

Poland's present attitude makes it necessary to make military preparations in addition to "Border Defense East", in order to preclude any possible threat from that quarter once and for all.

1. Political conditions and objective

Germany's attitude toward Poland will continue to aim at avoiding incidents. Should Poland change her attitude, which so far has been based on the same principle, and adopt a threatening attitude toward the Reich, then in spite of the existing treaty it might be necessary to settle the account for good.

Then the aim will be to smash the Polish armed forces and to create in the East a situation corresponding to the requirements of Germany's defense. The free city of Danzig will be declared part of Germany at the start of the conflict at the latest.

The government feels that it is necessary to isolate Poland in that case as much as possible, that is, to confine the war to Poland.

Increased inner tension in France and a resulting restraint on the part of Britain might cause such a situation to develop in the not too distant future.

Intervention by Russia, insofar as she is capable thereof, will avail Poland nothing in all probability, since this would mean Poland's destruction through Bolshevism.

[The attitude of the border states will be determined solely by the military superiority of Germany. During further developments it may become necessary to occupy the border states as far as the border of the old Kurland and to incorporate them into the Reich.] (Translator's note: The preceding paragraph in brackets was crossed out by hand and replaced by the sentence: "The attitude of the border states will be determined

solely by the military requirements of Germany." By order of OKW 37/39 of 13 Apr. 1939.)

Hungary cannot readily be counted upon as an ally of Germany. Italy's attitude will be determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis.

2. Military consequences

The enmity of the western democracies continues to determine the main aims in the expansion of the German Armed Forces. Operation "Weiss" is merely a precautionary supplementation of the preparations, but need in no way be considered a preliminary step in a military conflict with the western powers.

Poland's isolation will be all the more certain even after the outbreak of the war, the greater the surprise element, the stronger the blows struck, and the faster we achieve results.

The overall situation, however, will require in any case that measures be taken to protect the western frontier and the North Sea coast of Germany, including air defenses.

Defense measures should be taken against the border states, especially Lithuania, for the eventuality that Poland should send forces across their territory.

3. Tasks of the Armed Forces

It is the task of the Armed Forces to destroy the Polish armed forces. For this purpose an attempt should be made to launch the attack as a surprise, and preparations should be made accordingly. [General] * mobilization, either open or concealed, will be ordered only the day preceding the attack at the latest possible moment.

The forces intended for "Border Defense West" (see section I, "Border Defense") should not be otherwise disposed of for the time being.

The frontier toward Lithuania is to be protected; the other frontiers should only be watched.

4. Tasks of the branches of the Armed Forces

a. Army

The operational objective in the East is annihilation of the Polish army.

For this purpose, on the southern flank Slovakian territory may be entered. In the north the connection between Pomerania and East Prussia should be established quickly.

The preparations for the operation are to be made in such a way that it can be launched, to begin with, with the forces available, without awaiting arrival of the mobilized forces. These initial forces can be concentrated secretly immediately preceding the day of the attack. I reserve the decision on this matter.

It will depend on the political situation whether the forces intended

* Translator's note: The word "general" was inserted by order of OKW 37/39 on 13 Apr. 1939.

for "Border Defense West" will proceed there in full, or whether parts will become available for other purposes.

b. Navy

The Navy will have the following tasks in the Baltic Sea:

(1) To annihilate and eliminate the Polish naval forces.

(2) To block the sea lanes leading to the Polish naval bases, especially Gdynia. A departure deadline is to be announced to neutral ships in Polish harbors and Danzig when the German troops first enter Poland. When this deadline is passed, the Navy will be permitted to use barrages.

The disadvantages for naval warfare resulting from setting this deadline will have to be accepted.

(3) To stop Polish merchant shipping.

(4) To protect the sea routes from Germany to East Prussia.

(5) To protect German sea communications to Sweden and the Baltic countries.

(6) To reconnoiter and patrol, if possible undetected, in order to forestall possible intervention of Soviet naval forces from the Gulf of Finland.

The necessary naval forces are to be provided to defend the coast and coastal waters in the North Sea.

Measures which appear necessary in order to preclude a surprise intervention in the conflict by the western powers should be taken in the southern North Sea and the Skagerrak. They are to be confined to what is absolutely necessary. Care must be taken to keep them secret. It will be very important to avoid any action which might increase political tension as regards the western powers.

c. Air Force

The Air Force is to make a surprise attack on Poland, leaving the necessary forces in the West, however.

In addition to destroying the Polish air force in the shortest possible time, it is important for the Air Force to carry out the following tasks:

(1) To interfere with Polish mobilization and to prevent a systematic assembly of the Polish army.

(2) To support directly Army operations, especially the advance forces, from the moment they cross the frontier.

The possible transfer of air forces to East Prussia prior to the beginning of the operations must not be permitted to jeopardize the surprise element.

The time when the planes cross the frontier should be coordinated with the Army operations.

The harbor of Gdynia should not be attacked until the deadline set for

neutral shipping is past. (See paragraph 4 b.)

Air defenses should be concentrated at Stettin, Berlin, and the industrial area in Upper Silesia, including Ostrau and Bruenn in Moravia.

Supplement to O.K.W. Nr. 37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L I of 11 Apr. 1939

(Translator's note: issued by Keitel on 11 May 1939.)

(Annex II)

Top secret

Special Regulations for Operation "Weiss"

1. Legal basis

It is assumed that a state of defense or war, as defined by the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sep. 1938, will not be declared. All actions and demands for mobilization are to be based on peacetime laws. The principles of the Hague agreement for land warfare obtain. Supplementary instructions may be issued later.

2. Mobilization

The Armed Forces High Command will issue instructions regarding the scope of the advance preparations necessary for operation "Weiss", especially those covering induction of personnel and additional equipment.

If the Armed Forces or parts thereof are mobilized without public announcement (X case), this does not necessarily mean that X case will apply to the civilian sector and the armament industry. However, the Armed Forces High Command will take the steps necessary locally to mobilize the Armed Forces or parts thereof as well as maintain the efficiency of the civil authorities and industry.

If general mobilization of the entire Armed Forces is announced publicly (mobilization case), full mobilization necessarily and automatically follows for the civilian sector including the armament industry. Mobilization announced publicly is not to be reckoned with, however, if the military events remain confined to operation "Weiss".

3. Operations area and command authority

In case of operation "Weiss", Operations Area East will be declared by the Armed Forces High Command, and in case of Border Defense West, also the Operations Area West which has been specified for this purpose.

Once the German frontiers are crossed, the operations area is enlarged in accordance with the advance of the troops.

In the operations area of the Army, the Commander in Chief, Army, by special order, will have command authority, with the right to delegate this authority entirely or in part to the commanders of the armies.

4. The Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (V.G.A.D.), the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service, Coastal, and the Frontier Guard (Grenzwacht).

The Armed Forces High Command will issue orders for organizing the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Services and the Frontier Guard when necessary.

5. Authority of the Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air in questions of air defense.

The command authority delegated to the Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air according to OKW Nr. 2230/38 g.K. WFA/L II of 27 Sep. 1938, Section III in the event of mobilization or X case can become effective in a period of tension by order of the Supreme Commander.

6. Evacuation of border areas

No evacuation measures will be carried out in the East. The Army High Command will make preparations for receiving refugees from Poland of German origin.

7. Evacuation and quartering of population as protection against air attacks.

When population must be evacuated and quartered and other measures taken (evacuation of schools, public buildings, hospitals, etc.) as protection against air attacks, as provided in mobilization or X case, these measures are to be determined and dates set by the Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air, in cooperation with the responsible military and civilian authorities. Armed Forces High Command approval is needed to carry out such measures in periods of tension.

8. Command authority

Depending on the situation, the Commanders in Chief will be responsible for the following forces entirely or in part:

a. The Commander in Chief, Army

The Air Force units assigned for operation "Weiss".

The SS Special Employment Units (SS Verfuegungstruppe) according to OKW Nr. 1730/38 g.K. WFA/L II of 28 Aug. 1938.

To begin with the police forces provided by the mobilization regulations.

The parts of the Reich Labor Service designated in Special Annex 7 of the Army Mobilization Plan.

b. The Commander in Chief, Navy

The naval air forces.

The parts of the Reich Labor Service provided by the mobilization regulations.

c. The Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air

The parts of the Reich Labor Service designated in Special Annex 3 of the Air Force Mobilization Plan.

The Army units intended as airborne troops as requested by the Commander in Chief, Air.

9. Surveillance and interruption of communications at land and sea frontiers and discontinuance of rail, air, and ship traffic.

The necessary measures will be prepared by the Armed Forces High Command with the various branches of the Armed Forces so that in case operation "Weiss", and depending on the situation, they can be applied also at the other frontiers (including the coast) entirely or in part. Detailed regulations will follow.

10. Communications

OKW Nr. 1050/39 g.K. WFA/L IIe of 10 May 1939 obtains for the parts of the Armed Forces in the Army operations area.

During the progress of the operation in the Corridor, according to orders by the Army High Command the military, governmental, and private communication installations are to be occupied and to be utilized insofar as suitable after occupation of the Corridor to improve the communications between Germany and East Prussia as well as Danzig.

The Armed Forces High Command will order the time when the wartime radio regulations will go into effect, depending on the situation.

Armed Forces High Command approval must be obtained by the branches of the Armed Forces for blocking communications both private and public, except where such action is caused by combat operations or evacuation of border areas.

A change in our entire radio setup must not at first become apparent to the enemy radio intercept service. Therefore peacetime radio activity of the branches of the Armed Forces should be maintained until the beginning of operations. Further deceptive measures becoming necessary will be ordered by the branches of the Armed Forces.

Measures for disrupting non-military enemy broadcasts will be ordered by the Armed Forces High Command. Operational radio intelligence will be left to the branches of the Armed Forces, and should be carried out at an early date on a wartime basis.

11. Supplies

According to orders by the Commander in Chief, Army, the troops can be supplied from the occupied area. In this respect the emergency situation of the German minority should be sufficiently kept in mind.

In the occupied area according to the principles of the Hague agreement on land warfare requisitioning can be resorted to. Insofar as demands have to be made on persons of German origin, payment must be made in German currency.

The Armed Forces High Command will announce at the given time the exchange rate for such payments.

12. (Translator's note: The original paragraph was crossed out and the

following one inserted.)

Compensation (pay, rations, billets, clothing, welfare)

The parts of the Armed Forces for which X case has been ordered will receive compensation beginning with the first X day according to the draft of the Armed Forces Compensation Law (EWGG).

Officers and Armed Forces officials commissioned for the duration (des Beurlaubtenstandes) will continue to receive in addition to the provisions of paragraph 3 (1) of the EWGG one half of the training pay, and the non-commissioned officers of this kind the full training pay. The training pay for the lower grades is included in the regular pay.

Paragraph 3, sections 2 to 4 of the EWGG (deduction of the equalization sum), paragraph 7 (additional pay for front service), and paragraph 8 (change in travel expenses and command remuneration) are not applicable.

13. Entry of additional costs

Additional costs caused by operation "Weiss" are to be booked definitely as expenditures under VIII E 230 (Armed Forces High Command budget) which was set up for this purpose.

Annex III to

OKW Nr. 37/39 g.Kdos. Chefs. WFA/L I No. 2 of five copies

Top secret

III.

Occupation of Danzig

The free city of Danzig may be occupied by surprise independently of occupation "Weiss" if the political situation is favorable.

The following principles must be kept in mind during the preparations:

"Command Authority in East Prussia in Case of a Warlike Entanglement" (see Annex IV) will become effective as regards paragraph 3.

The Army will undertake the occupation from East Prussia.

The Navy will support the Army operation through intervention at sea according to more detailed orders of the Commander in Chief, Navy. The naval forces involved are to be instructed to cooperate with the Army.

The Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air is to examine to what extent the Air Force can participate in the occupation.

The branches of the Armed Forces will arrange the details directly with one another.

[redacted]

Supplement to OKW Nr. 37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L I of 11 Apr. 1939

(Translator's note: Issued by Keitel on 11 May 1939.)

(Annex III)

Top secret

Special Regulations for the Occupation of Danzig

1. General

It is to be assumed that through the occupation of the free city of Danzig a purely German area will again come under the sovereignty of the German Reich after long separation.

2. Legal basis

It is to be assumed that a state of defense or war, as defined by the Reich Defense Law of 4 Sep. 1938, will not be declared.

3. Mobilization

Since the occupation of Danzig will be carried out only with parts of the peacetime Armed Forces without reinforcement through mobilization, no mobilization measures should be expected either in the civilian sector, including the armament industry.

4. Operations area and command authority

No operations area will be declared on German territory, but when the frontier is crossed the Commander in Chief, Army will have command authority with the right to delegate it entirely or in part to the Commanding General of the I Army Corps.

5. The Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service (V.G.A.D.), the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service, Coastal, and the Frontier Guard (Grenzwacht).

The Armed Forces High Command will issue orders for organizing the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Services and the Frontier Guard when necessary.

6. Command authority

Annex IV of the "Directive for Unified War Preparations for the Armed Forces for 1939-40" (OKW Nr. 37/39 g.K. Chefs. WFA/L I of 11 Apr. 1939) applies regarding subordination of Air Force units to the Army.

Parts of the naval air forces will be subordinated to the Navy following agreement between the Commanders in Chief, Navy and Air.

SS Special Employment Units (SS Verfuegungstruppe) and police troops participating in the occupation will be subordinated to the Army High Command.

7. Surveillance and interruption of communications at land and sea frontiers and discontinuance of rail, air, and ship traffic.

The I Army Corps, which is to carry out the occupation of Danzig, can make the necessary preparations in East Prussia independently.

The Armed Forces High Command will order such measures in other areas

of the Reich.

8. Communications

The I Army Corps can use the official and private communications installations. This command is to ensure the needs of the Air Force and naval units involved.

The Armed Forces Communications Command Koenigsberg is under Army Corps Area I.

In the occupied area the military, governmental, and private communications installations should be seized promptly. After being blocked for the enemy they should be put to use again.

The Army High Command will give special orders for radio communications during the operation, insofar as this cannot be done by the I Army Corps, especially for the necessary intercommunication between the units of the three branches of the Armed Forces.

9. Supplies

The troops can be supplied from the occupied area in accordance with the regulations issued by the Commander in Chief, Army. Procedure should be according to German laws.

All goods and services should be paid for in German currency, and requisitioning should be avoided if possible.

The rate of exchange for all payments will be announced by the Armed Forces High Command at the proper time.

10. Pay and rations

The Armed Forces units involved receive additional pay and rations according to Supplement 4 of Army Regulations 159 (H Dv).

11. Entry of additional costs

Additional costs caused by the occupation of Danzig are to be booked definitely as expenditures under VIII E 230 (Armed Forces High Command budget) which was set up for this purpose.

Annex IV to
OKW L Ia Nr. 37/39 g.Kdos.Chefs.* No. 2 of five copies

Top secret

IV.

Command Authority in East Prussia in Case of a Warlike Entanglement

1. In case of a warlike entanglement the commander of Corps Area I as Commander of the 3rd Army will have command in East Prussia. He alone will be responsible for the defense of East Prussia, which he must carry on with all possible efforts and means, in order to save this province for the Reich. The Commander in Chief, Air will make the necessary preparations for the air defense of East Prussia as part of overall warfare.

2. The Commander of Corps Area I will take over command authority for the entire province when he receives the code number "9434" (assumption of command) for advance preparations for X case in East Prussia. He can issue regulations, establish special courts, and give orders to all government and military establishments in East Prussia. His authority takes precedence over that of other otherwise superior offices.

3. The air commander at the 3rd Army and the air forces assigned to that command will be under the tactical command of the commanding general of this army.

The other air forces in East Prussia are subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Air through the Air Force Command, East Prussia.

The principles of directive OKW Nr. 1922/38 g.Kdos. WFA/L of 27 Sep. 1938 regulate the command authority of the 3rd Army with regard to the Air Force in East Prussia.

4. The agreements reached between the Army and Navy High Commands concerning subordination of naval forces and commands in East Prussia to the 3rd Army will remain effective.

5. German troops should under no circumstances violate foreign frontiers until my explicit permission is received or until numerous frontier violations by a foreign power have been established beyond a doubt.

6. Should a part of East Prussia be threatened by armed force unexpectedly and no special defense orders can be awaited, the Commander of Corps Area I has the right to issue the necessary and indispensable orders for the protection of the border area to all civil and military authorities in East Prussia on his own responsibility. Execution of these orders takes precedence over other tasks and orders of superior offices.

The Commander of Corps Area I can in this case delegate authority to subordinate commanders down to station commanders.

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* Translator's note: According to WFA Nr. 37/39 g.Kdos. Chefs. L I 2 Angel. of 13 Apr. 1939, this section is the same as issued under OKW 230/38 g.Kdos. Chefs. L Ia on 27 Sep. 1938.

Annex V to
OKW L Ia Nr. 37/39 g.Kdos.Chefs. No. 2 of five copies

V.

Operations Areas of the Army

I approve the Army operations areas according to the attached maps. (Translator's note: Not included.)

Operations Area West applies to Border Defense West and defense of the western frontier.

Operations Area East applies to Border Defense East and operation "Weiss".

When our troops cross the Reich frontier or the border of the Slovakian protective zone the operations area will expand accordingly.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Armed Forces High Command Berlin 10 May 1939

Nr. 1050/39 g.Kdos. WFA/L IIc 200 copies

Top secret

Re: Command authority in the Army operations area

1. In the entire operations area it is the primary task of the Army to combat the enemy land troops, of the Navy to combat enemy naval forces, and of the Air Force to combat enemy air forces.

The only exception is combat carried on by the Army and the Navy with their own weapons and the air forces permanently subordinate to them for the protection of their troops, ships, or fortified areas against enemy fliers.

All other exceptions (e.g., participation of parts of the Air Force or the Navy in land fighting) come under the responsibility of the Armed Forces High Command, as does any direct cooperation between the branches of the Armed Forces, and will be directed by this command insofar as necessary.

Division of the operations area into several zones (Army operations area, Navy fortification area, and home area) must not interfere with the cooperation of the branches of the Armed Forces.

The command authority in the Army operations area is as follows:

I. Command authority of the Commander in Chief, Army

2. The following are under the Commander in Chief, Army or his

subordinate commands (Army Commands, Corps Commands) in the Army operations area:

a. The commands and troops of other branches of the Armed Forces under the tactical command of the Commander in Chief, Army.

For details concerning the Air Force see section III.

b. Other naval and Air Force commands and personnel in the operations area (war economy inspectorates, replacement troops, schools) as regards billets (except for ground installations of the Air Force); transport and traffic regulations (cf. no. 14); evacuation of the combat area; intelligence; medical services (except troop medical services); pay, rations; supply of motor vehicle fuel; field postal service.

Unified direction of counterintelligence is in the hands of the Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command according to special instructions.

3. When a state of defense or war is declared, the Commander in Chief, Army or the commanding generals of the armies will have command authority in the operations area in accordance with the Reich Defense Law without need for special orders.

If these commanders are to have command authority without previous declaration of a state of defense or war, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces will issue the necessary orders.

The command authority of the Commander in Chief, Army and of the commanding generals of the armies will include the right to issue regulations in the Army operations areas, establish special courts, and give orders to the competent authorities and commands, with the exception of the highest Reich authorities, the highest Prussian office, and the highest Party office.

The regulations take precedence over directives of otherwise superior offices.

4. A "Civilian Deputy at the Army High Command" will be attached to the Commander in Chief, Army, and a "Chief of the Civil Administration" will be attached to the Army Commands.

Their duties are defined in the Army Regulations (H Dv) 90, paragraphs 9, 11, 21, 24, 26, 27, 29, 36, and 120.

5. The war economy offices will remain directly subordinate to the Armed Forces High Command and the branches of the Armed Forces for directing production and distribution in the armament industry, as well as for general tasks in the armament industry.

If the war economy office is located in the operations zone, it comes under the territorial command of the commanding general of the army in that area. If the office is not in the operations zone, then that part of its area which is in the operations zone is under the respective Army Command.

When in exceptional cases the Army Command must fall back on armament plants in its area for additional repair of equipment, the liaison officer of the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Staff or the Chief of the Civil Administration (the special deputy of the Plenipotentiary General) will be consulted.

6. The Army Command is responsible for protecting the troops and Army installations in the operations area against air attacks. For exceptions see section III.

II. Division of Command between the Field Army and the Navy in the Army Operations Area

7. When parts of the coast in which there are Navy installations or troops are included in the Army operations area, they are put under the tactical command of the competent Army command as regards land warfare.

For tasks pertaining to naval warfare, they continue to be under the Commander in Chief, Navy.

III. Division of Command between the Field Army and the Air Force in the Army Operations Area

8. Air defense in the Army operations area by means of air forces is the exclusive task of the Commander in Chief, Air. The same applies to the naval fortifications areas.

9. The Commander in Chief, Air and the Air Force administrative districts are responsible for using antiaircraft artillery to protect:

a. Important installations in the operations area which are not of direct importance to the war. Army Commands should be informed about such air defense measures.

b. Forces which are under the command of the Commander in Chief, Air and Air Force installations, especially ground installations.

10. The Commander in Chief, Army is to carry out the following tasks with the air forces placed under his command (antiaircraft artillery):

a. Air defense in the entire combat area.

b. Air defense of installations and areas in the rear area of the Army which are of special importance for direct land warfare.

Insofar as additional forces of the Commander in Chief, Air are used for this purpose by order of the Armed Forces High Command or by agreement between the Army and the Air Force, these can be withdrawn only with the consent of the Army. In cases of doubt, the Armed Forces High Command will decide.

11. If Air Force units or installations which organizationally are under the Commander in Chief, Air are located or used in the Army operations area (planes, antiaircraft artillery, parts of the Air Force signal troops or the plane reporting service, and ground installations), they remain on principle under the command of the Commander in Chief, Air. (Cf. no. 14 for billeting, transport, and troop movements.)

12. If on the basis of the general air situation strong defense forces are committed by the Commander in Chief, Air in the Army operations area, they remain under the command of the Commander in Chief, Air. If Army antiaircraft artillery is within such air defense zones, the commander of the zone is responsible for coordinating their use. This does not affect their subordination to the Army.

In cases of doubt the Armed Forces High Command will decide about the strength of the air defense forces to be used in the operations area.

13. The following are responsible for civil air defense in the Army operations area in accordance with the general instructions of the Commander in Chief, Air:

a. The Army Commands in the Army combat areas.

b. The Air Force administrative district commands in the rear of the Army, in agreement with the competent Army Command.

The combat areas will be defined by the Army Commands.

When an air defense zone is entirely or in part in the Army operations area, the same instructions apply regarding air defense and civil air defense as in the operations area.

14. Troop movements

Larger troop movements (this means units larger than platoons), transports, and allocation of billets for units of the Air Force which are under the Commander in Chief, Air will be coordinated in the Army operations area with the needs of the Army by the competent Army Command. The Army Command, however, is responsible for seeing that the Air Force units are integrated in Army transports and troops movements in such a manner that Air Force operations are not delayed thereby. This applies especially to supply transports.

The air commands via the Air Commander are to report all requirements pertaining to the above-mentioned matters promptly to the competent Army Command. Regulations issued by the Army Commands on these matters will be transmitted to the Air Force commands by the Air Commander and are binding for the Air Force.

The communications liaison officers of the Air Force attached to the Army communications commanders will look after the interests of Air Force communications in the Army operations area.

These liaison officers are to maintain close contact with the Air Force commanders at the Army Commands.

The Air Force signal troops under the Commander in Chief, Air which are in the Army operations area in accordance with no. 11 are instructed to cooperate closely with the communications liaison officers of the Air Force attached to the Army Commands.

16. In occupied enemy territory within the Army operations area the Army may use non-military communications installations. Within the Reich such installations are to be used through the competent Armed Forces communications command, which is instructed to cooperate with the Army communications commanders.

In the occupied enemy territory the authority of the Armed Forces communications commands extends only as far as the nearest communications center (transmitter station, amplifier station, etc.) on the other side of the frontier or of the rear border of the operations area.

Air Force needs regarding non-military communications installations within the Army operations area should be handled through the Armed Forces communications commands in accordance with the regulations issued by the Armed Forces High Command only within Reich territory. In enemy territory on the other hand, the communications liaison officers of the Air Force handle all Air Force requirements concerning non-military communications installations directly with the Army Command.

These commands, insofar as possible, must meet the requirements of the Air Force equally with those of the Army.

17. Within the Army operations area, the Air Force has its own wire communications for operations of Air Force units. The senior communications commander of the competent Air Force command, or at his direction the communications commander of the competent Air Force administrative district is responsible for establishing the Air Force wire communications system. The Air Force needs are handled by the Air Force communications officers attached to the Army commands in accordance with no. 15.

Army and Air Force should cooperate closely in establishing the wire communications systems so as to avoid interfering with one another's communications. The Army Command will issue the orders necessary for establishing the cross-communications between the two systems.

In the combat area Air Force signal troops will report their task upon arrival to the competent local Army commander and will request assignment of a base for their activities.

18. The Air Force radio regulations apply to the air forces in the Army operations area which are under the command of the Commander in Chief, Air.

The air forces attached to the Army will follow the radio regulations of the Army.

The Air Force is to comply with the Army requests for radio communications in the operations area, insofar as the tasks of the Air Force permit.

If radio silence has been ordered, the following radio services are exempted unless other orders are given by the Commander in Chief, Air:

a. The tactical radio communications of the flying forces.

b. The air escort traffic in emergencies.

c. Radio beacons.

d. The orders of the air reporting companies and their reports at the approach of planes.

e. Weather broadcasts.

f. Radio messages within antiaircraft battalions and antiaircraft searchlight battalions of the Commander in Chief, Air when planes are approaching and other means of communication are not available.

Certain limitations as to time and number of messages sent can be imposed, however, by the Commander in Chief, Air or the competent Air Force commander on his own responsibility or on request of the Army Commands if the situation so requires.

The Air Force communications liaison officers are to inform the Army Commands concerning the radio communications of the air forces in the Army operations area.

19. Directive OKW Nr. 1922/38 g.Kdos. WFA/L of 27 Sep. 1938 is cancelled hereby and should be destroyed.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command
signed: Keitel

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin 10 May 1939

Nr. 48/39 g.K. WFA/L (I) — No. 2 of seven copies

Top secret

Re: Directive for Unified War Preparations by the Armed Forces for 1939-40 (OKW Nr. 37/39 g.K. Chefs. WFA/L (I) of 11 Apr. 1939)

The enclosed directives for economic warfare and the protection of the German economy are part VI of the above directive.

The Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Armed Forces are to report to the Armed Forces High Command by 1 Aug. 1939 the measures taken on the basis of these directives.

signed: Adolf Hitler

Annex VI to
OKW Nr. 37/39 g.K. WFA/L Ia Chefs. — No. 2 of seven copies

Top secret

VI.

Directives for War Against the Enemy Economy (Economic Warfare) and Protective Measures for the German Economy

I. Preliminary remarks

1. The Navy and the Air Force are the most important instruments for attacking the enemy economy. Their measures are supplemented by sabotage warfare (Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division). The task of the Army can consist in expanding the German lebensraum by capturing enemy territory which is of special importance for the German economy.

The Plenipotentiary General for the Economy (GBW) has the task of preparing measures for economic warfare.

The Armed Forces High Command (the Operations Section in connection with the War Economy Staff) will coordinate all measures against the enemy economy. The same applies to the protective measures for the German economy.

2. In sections II and III of this directive, guiding principles for economic warfare and for protective measures are issued for the event of Border Defense and operation "Weiss". They show the preparations to be made by the branches of the Armed Forces and the Plenipotentiary General for the Economy.

3. Agreement concerning evaluation of the enemy economy is basic to unified economic warfare. For this the following guiding principles

obtain:

a. The War Economy Staff of the Armed Forces High Command is responsible for a comprehensive evaluation of the economy of the countries in question, on the basis of information supplied by its own office, by the Armed Forces Intelligence Division, and the various branches of the Armed Forces. For this purpose it is necessary to cooperate closely with the branches of the Armed Forces, the Foreign Office, the Plenipotentiary General of the Economy, and other offices dealing with this matter.

b. The branches of the Armed Forces, in cooperation with the Armed Forces High Command (War Economy Staff and Intelligence Division), will furnish information useful for their operations, and will transmit to the Armed Forces High Command (War Economy Staff) reports pertaining to the evaluation of the war economy of the enemy countries.

II. Directive for "Border Defense"

1. Attack on the enemy economy

a. General

Operation "Border Defense" stipulates merely the defense measures to be taken at the outbreak of war. In addition it is necessary to make special naval and Air Force preparations for the immediate start of economic warfare. Preparations should be directed primarily against Britain and secondarily against France. Britain and France should be considered an economic bloc as regards fields where economic exchange appears possible. It is important to recognize not only the most important sources of strength, but above all the bottlenecks of the enemy economy.

In the course of all combat measures the sovereignty of neutral states must not be violated.

b. Army

The Commander in Chief, Army, in cooperation with the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Staff, is to make preparations to disrupt and destroy enemy economic and supply installations which are within shooting range of the weapons used in border defense.

If our forces advance into enemy territory, the higher commands, together with the liaison officers of the War Economy Staff, will determine which economic and supply installations should be spared for our own later use. It is especially important to safeguard promptly supplies of all kinds in the occupied enemy territory. They should be reported to the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Staff.

c. Navy

The Navy will prepare economic warfare against Britain and France within its sphere. In accordance with the prevailing political situation in peacetime and considering the possible combination of enemies, the type of merchant warfare planned should be subjected to constant scrutiny by legal and military authorities in cooperation with the Foreign Office, and should be adapted to anticipated developments.

The operations areas for merchant warfare are to be determined and constantly reexamined by the Commanders in Chief, Navy and Air.

d. Air Force

Preparations should be made for attacking enemy food, raw material, and production sources, as well as the armament industry, for the purpose of paralyzing them. In cooperation with the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Staff and the Commander in Chief, Navy, these attacks should be concentrated on those sources, the loss of which will most seriously affect the war economy of the enemy.

In attacking the enemy sea communications, it is especially important to choose targets in closest cooperation with the Naval High Command, in order to concentrate the attacks of the two branches of the Armed Forces.

2. Protection of the German economy

a. In case of operation "Border Defense" the Reich area (including the Czech Protectorate and the Slovakian protective zone) is considered safe for the German economy insofar as it is not within firing range of the French border fortifications.

b. In the home area the planned protective measures (active and passive air defense, factory defense, prevention of sabotage, etc.) which are part of the advance preparations or of mobilization measures become effective.

c. In the Army operations area the same measures apply as in the home area, insofar as Reich territory (including the Czech Protectorate and the Slovakian protective zone) is concerned. If enemy territory is occupied, the objects to be protected should be determined between the higher Army and Air Force commands, with the participation of the liaison officers of the War Economy Staff. It is to be assured that war industries continue to be supplied and to carry on production and that their products are transported away with as little disturbance as possible even in the operations area.

d. In the sea and coastal areas the Commander in Chief, Navy is responsible for the protection of commerce to the extent stipulated by the directive for unified warfare. In the case of war with Britain, no German exports and imports overseas can be reckoned with, except for individual blockade runners, so that in this case protection of commerce will be confined only to the Baltic Sea and the coastal waters of the North Sea.

3. Special economic preparations for war

Since Germany will be cut off from imports from the Atlantic in case of war with Britain, the Plenipotentiary General for the Economy, in cooperation with the Armed Forces High Command, War Economy Staff and other agencies involved, must make the following preparations as of prime importance:

a. Increase exchange of goods with Italy.

b. Increase imports from the southeast area.

c. Ensure the ore supplies from Scandinavia and route ore shipments via the southern Swedish harbors.

d. Make the necessary changes (transportation, etc.) connected herewith within the German economy.

III. Directive for operation "Weiss"

1. It is important to seize the Polish industrial installations as undamaged as possible. Therefore they are to be attacked only if there is direct military necessity to do so.

2. It is important for the war economy to occupy quickly the Polish Upper Silesian and Cieszyn industrial areas.

3. Naval measures should be taken to cut any imports by sea to Poland. For this purpose, depending on the political situation, the method of warfare against Polish imports is to be determined in cooperation with the Foreign Office. The treatment of neutral shipping and of goods which are shipped to neutral ports and are possibly meant for Poland is especially important.

4. The principles of operation "Border Defense" apply for the protection of the German economy.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY

(Edition of May 1939)

Purpose

1. The "Battle Instructions for the Navy" are to serve as a general basis and to provide for uniform guidance of the operational and organizational ground-work of the commanding officers in the event of war.

These instructions specify the probable tasks to be expected during the opening phase of a war, and give directions for the employment of the means for waging war, and for the conduct of naval warfare in the various sea areas with the means available at present. With the commencement of hostilities, they go into effect in every case without special orders being issued.

Part I

Fundamental Military and Political Considerations

2. Political developments during the past few years have led to the formation of clearly defined political fronts by the Great Powers of Europe.

On one side stand Germany and Italy, joined by Hungary and Spain and, outside of Europe, Japan. The amount of assistance to be expected from these three states in case of war cannot be established with certainty at the present time.

The opposing front is formed by the western democracies, Britain and France, who have recently established close connections with Poland and Turkey. The position of Russia, which was about to conclude a close alliance with Britain and France in April 1939, is not clear at the present.

The U.S.A. are definitely inclined to favor the side of the western democracies, with whom they are linked by strong economic, ideological, and racial connections, although it is not absolutely necessary for the time being to reckon with their military intervention should hostilities break out.

The remaining European states have not definitely taken sides. In spite of strong popular inclination towards the western democracies, Holland, Belgium and the three Scandinavian countries will endeavour to maintain their neutrality as long as possible. Their future attitude during the course of a war will be determined by the political pressure the Great Powers may be able to bring to bear upon them and also by the prospects of success of the two sides.

Finland and the Border States, too, must remain neutral. If Russia should participate in the war, we must reckon with the possibility that they will be overrun by Russia in a short time.

The position in Southeastern Europe is still extremely uncertain. The attitude of the Balkan States, if matters become serious, will be decisively determined by the force exerted by the belligerent parties.

3. The clear grouping of the leading Great Powers of Europe makes a war confined to a limited area improbable. It is therefore necessary to adjust ourselves to the possibility of a war on two fronts, against Britain and France and against at least one opponent in the East -

Russia or Poland. This, the most unfavorable case, has been made the basis of these instructions, since our preparations must be adapted to meet it. They will then also be adequate for simpler situations.

4. Methods of opening and waging war have fundamentally changed. Just as we must be prepared today for the unforeseen commencement of hostilities without a declaration of war, other forms of warfare must not take us by surprise. We must reckon with the possibility of the use of force without the use of weapons, perhaps in the shape of intensified economic warfare by means of national interdiction of commerce, boycotts, armed demonstrations, so-called peace blockades and the like. Instructions regarding our own military behaviour to meet such cases cannot be issued in advance. It will be the duty of the Reich Government to order the countermeasures for each case. It is important, nevertheless, to recognize these possibilities even now and to prepare for them.

5. The Navy must keep in mind the fact that we are already living in a pre-war period and that the struggle has already begun between the nations, though so far without recourse to arms. Unremitting and swift readiness for action of all means for waging war constitutes the key military prerequisite for national policy. To fulfill this demand, the principles applying in normal times of peace must be set aside as necessity may require.

6. - 8. Blank.

Part II

The Tasks of the German Navy

9. A strong fleet, by its very existence alone, can be a very effective instrument of political and strategic pressure in the hands of the political leaders of the Reich. Even in peacetime it is capable of making our influence felt on the countries with which the sea links us.

10. The aim of a war will be decided by the political leaders of the Reich. It may be limited. Generally, however, it can be attained only by the complete defeat of the enemy. The firm determination to achieve a desired goal will maintain the necessary energy and endurance, even in difficult situations and over long periods of time.

The required military measures and operations will be carried out by the three branches of the Armed Forces in close cooperation following the instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

11. For the Navy, the primary condition for fulfilling the war tasks is constant readiness of the means for waging war in accordance with the Naval Mobilization Plan (Mob-Plan Marine) and unremitting attention of the commanding officers to their war assignments. The possibility that our political opponents may open war by a surprise attack must always be borne in mind.

12. The general tasks of the German Navy in wartime are as follows:

(a) Protection of the coast against enemy operations from the sea and from the air.

(b) Protection of our sea communications.

(c) Attack on enemy sea communications.

(d) Support of land and air warfare along the coast.

(e) Use as politico-strategic instrument, e.g., to ensure the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries and of the Baltic States.

13. In its fight for sea communications considerable support can be given the Navy by the other two branches of the Armed Forces, depending on the situation:

(a) By land warfare, through the occupation of enemy coasts and seizure of the shore installations for purposes of naval warfare and merchant traffic.

(b) By the Air Force, through air attacks on bases and harbor installations and through air warfare in waters closed to naval warfare.

14. The conditions of warfare to which the Navy is subject, especially with regard to restrictions imposed by international law, are directly and largely dependent on our political successes in dealing with neutral countries.

15. Blank.

Part III

General Organization

a. Organization of Command

In the event of war, the following organization of command and assignment of tasks obtain:

16. The Chief, Naval Staff will conduct naval warfare as a part of the war as a whole, and will set objectives and dates of the necessary operations accordingly. By means of his instructions and orders he will integrate warfare in the various sea areas, designate the focal points, and arrange the distribution of his forces correspondingly.

17. The following are responsible for the direction of operations and the conduct of the war in accordance with these instructions and orders:

In the Baltic Sea

Commanding Admiral, Group East in Swinemuende.

In the North Sea

Commanding Admiral, Group West in Wilhelmshaven.

Until Group West is mobilized and ready to function, the Naval Staff will handle the task of this group. (Marginal note: Cancelled by Ia 1508/39.)

The Naval Staff will assume direct responsibility for operations in foreign waters.

b. Demarcation of Command Areas (cf. service instructions for Group Commands) (Translator's note: not included).

18. The command area of the Commanding Admiral, Group East comprises the Baltic and the entrances to the Baltic up to a line from Skagen to Goeteborg.

19. The command area of the Commanding Admiral, Group West comprises

the North Sea including the Skagerrak and the approaches to the Atlantic (Channel and sea area between Scotland, the Faroes, and Norway).

Precise demarcation of this operational area on the side of the Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea will be determined by the Naval Staff in accordance with the development of the situation, should need arise.

20. Any shifts in the command area boundaries which may become necessary will be ordered by the Chief, Naval Staff.

21. Blank.

c. Distribution of Forces

22. Command organization and appointments are regulated by the service instructions for Group Commands, the Order of Battle, and the appointment plan.

23. As regards forces, the Group Commanders will, according to the Order of Battle, generally have at their disposal the units stationed in th eir area in peacetime. Any exceptions to this can be seen from Appendix I of operational instructions "Allocation of Naval and Air Forces". (Translator's note: not included.)

24. Temporary escort units will not be set up. In case of emergency, the Group Commanders can, however, fall back on the vessels of all naval stations in their areas.

25. The forces placed at the disposal of the Naval Staff, for special duties, according to the Order of Battle, Plan 1 and Appendix 1 of Battle Instructions, are meant for service in foreign waters or at especially critical points. Until committed by the Naval Staff, they are at the disposal of the Groups.

26. The forces placed at the disposal of the Naval Staff for special duties, which are suitable for use on the high seas, are to be prepared therefor by the appropriate naval commanders according to the mobilization regulations. Independent of other preparatory measures undertaken in expectation of war, orders can be given by the Chief, Naval Staff for equipping these vessels early enough for them to be in their operations areas when war breaks out (e.g., by means of a keyword in accordance with Mobilization Plan, Navy, Special Appendix 5).

27. The Commander, Pocket Battleships may be placed in command of surface forces assigned to ocean warfare.

28. The distribution of forces has been planned on the basis of a war on two fronts, with the focal point in the West. However, there will always be important tasks for our Navy to perform in the Baltic Sea as well. The distribution of forces takes this into account. Therefore at the outset this distribution will become effective in any case.

29. The comparative strength and the war tasks will necessitate concentrating on certain areas, and the forces must be distributed accordingly. This concentration of forces can lead to a substantial restriction in the objectives of Group Commanders, who may have to relinquish considerable forces in favor of the main theater of war at a given time. Group Commanders must therefore endeavour to be prepared from the first for concentrations even within their own theaters of war, and must base all their preparations on a minimum of forces.

30. The Naval Staff will probably quite often allocate forces from

the Baltic Sea to the Commanding Admiral, Group West, especially when ice conditions in the Baltic Sea preclude operations by Russian naval forces, and when surprise attacks by other countries adjacent to the Baltic Sea, Poland in particular, need not be feared.

In no event can there be any question of removing all naval forces from the Baltic Sea, on account of the importance of shipping there. The defense of the entrances to the Baltic Sea against penetration by hostile naval forces, particularly submarines, must always be maintained.

In case Russia does not take part in the war officially, we must reckon with camouflaged action by Russian forces, especially by submarines.

31. - 39. Blank.

Part IV

General Instructions

a. Naval Warfare in Home Waters

40. In a war on two fronts with Britain, France and Russia as opponents, the Navy is faced with a task for which it is not yet sufficiently prepared. Intensive concentration of forces is therefore especially important.

41. In the Baltic Sea, defense of our important sea communications with the Scandinavian countries and with East Prussia is the main object. As long as the enemy respects neutral territorial waters, these protective measures are necessary only in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. Since from our point of view these areas are for all practical purposes coastal waters and offer our naval warfare all the advantages deriving therefrom, the task to be performed here can be completed with a minimum of heavy naval forces.

The sea communications across the Baltic Sea are not vital for Russia. The elimination of the Russian Baltic Fleet would be the best solution of our defense task. Our aim must therefore be to conduct offensive warfare in the Baltic Sea as far as the forces at our disposal permit.

42. We do not have any substantial task of protecting merchant shipping in the North Sea, because Britain, due to her favorable geographic-military position, can and will throttle our sea communications passing through that area in the shortest possible time. It is impossible for us to force open the northern approaches of the North Sea for our own supply to the extent necessary.

Our forced abandonment of the North Sea supply route will enable us to make forces available to a certain extent for offensive action against the enemy's supply lines. The aim of our naval warfare in the West is therefore to cripple Britain's and France's military and economic imports by water. They can be successfully attacked only on the oceans.

Britain will endeavour to block the North Sea completely and thereby eliminate our sole bases for carrying on the war in the Atlantic. To do this, Britain will use an extensive blockade. We need not reckon with a tight blockade in our coastal waters, in view of the strength of our coastal defenses. It is rather to be assumed that Britain will limit her activities in the southern area of the North Sea to mine and submarine warfare and will establish a blockade in the Channel and in the area between the Orkneys, Shetlands and Norway. Since we will be excluded from the Channel in a very short time, to judge by our experience in the last war, the northern area of the North Sea is to be re-

garded from the very first as a focal point of the war at sea.

43. The aim of warfare in this area will be:

(a) To disturb constantly British operations in building up their blockade.

(b) To relieve warfare in the Atlantic by keeping as many of the enemy forces as possible continuously tied up.

(c) To force the blockade occasionally, for Atlantic forces returning to port or putting to sea.

We will not be able to win permanent mastery of the sea in this area. We must endeavour to solve this problem by means of intensive small-scale warfare, surprise attacks on weaker units, accumulation of partial successes, and constant harassing action.

44. In the execution of specific tasks it will also be possible to provide for the direct employment of the operational forces of the Air Force for the war at sea. Such operations demand the closest cooperation between the two branches of the Armed Forces.

b. Naval Warfare in Foreign Waters

45. The task of naval warfare in foreign waters is to attack merchant shipping. This is directed equally against the cargoes and the shipping space of the enemy. Combat action even against inferior enemy naval forces is not an end in itself, and is therefore not to be sought. Even slight damage can decrease the effectiveness and the cruising endurance of our merchant raiders.

The operational areas for surface forces are the high seas. War on merchant shipping in enemy coastal waters is the task of submarines. As a rule submarines must also be conceded better prospects of success off ports of departure and at special focal points of merchant shipping, due to the strong defenses to be expected there.

Direct attack upon enemy ports of transshipment, shipyards, and land transport routes and facilities will be the task of the Air Force operating from the mainland. If the Air Force cannot carry out this operation to a sufficient extent because of lack of range or for other reasons, it will be the Navy's task to interrupt sea communications with these ports, either in coastal waters or on the high seas.

46. Forces which are suitable for ocean warfare and are at sea in foreign waters when war breaks out will immediately be put into operation in the war against merchant shipping. Efforts will be made to dispatch additional forces and supply ships in good time before war breaks out.

47. Efforts will be made to assure the necessary fuel and arms supplies by means of an Etappe service* and the help of friendly neutrals, obtaining their consent to use their harbors for equipping and repair work. In spite of this, ships will have to depend to a great extent on getting their supplies from prizes. In case of emergency, supplies may also be obtained from neutral ships on the basis of distress regulations.

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* Translator's note: The Etappe was the secret German naval organization for providing German naval vessels with information and supplies from foreign bases.

More detailed instructions will be issued at the proper time regarding the possibilities of support from neutrals or allies (supplies, forwarding of messages, submarine berths).

48. If the return home of merchant raiders no longer seems possible, they will carry out the war against merchant shipping until all stores are completely exhausted.

49. Blank.

c. Principles of International Law

50. Appendix 9 contains instructions for conduct with respect to international law.

51. Blank.

d. Merchant Shipping

52. Organization of export and import will be the duty of the Economics Ministry (what goods, from where, to where) in cooperation with the Transportation Ministry (furnishing the necessary shipping space available).

The Navy will take over the defense and control of sea communications and will issue the necessary orders.

The Naval Staff will direct sea communications on the basis of situation reports from the operational areas and the import situation.

Shipping in foreign waters will be directly controlled by the Naval Staff.

The Naval Group Commanders are responsible within their own operational areas for the direction and protection of merchant shipping in home waters. Group West is also responsible for the approaches to the Atlantic.

53. As far as necessary, the Transportation Ministry will be kept informed by the Naval Staff regarding instructions issued to shipping and diversion of merchant ships to other ports necessitated by the naval situation.

As a rule, these instructions will be issued directly by the Group Commanders or Defense Commanders via Navy offices to the appropriate shipping officials for forwarding to the shipowners, or, in urgent cases, to the captains of the ships themselves. (See also special appendix 12 to Naval Mobilization Plan. Translator's note: not included.)

54. The instructions issued to merchant ships for periods of tension and in the event of war are set forth in "Special Instructions for Merchant Ships" (see appendix 10). Their execution will be ordered by the Naval Staff by means of code telegrams. In peacetime, trawlers about to put to sea will receive oral instructions regarding their actions from the Naval Staff.

55. Control will be exercised less by designation of areas and routes to be followed, than by warnings of endangered areas and reports on the enemy.

Independent of the control of shipping by the Naval Staff and the Group Commanders, it will remain the duty of the commanders of all warships

and planes to report any enemy merchant raiders detected, especially submarines, in uncoded radio messages, if the military situation permits their transmission, and thus to warn our shipping.

If orders by the Group Commanders should exceed their jurisdiction and have general application, they are to be issued through the Naval Staff.

56. The naval communications service reaches all seagoing vessels reported by the Shipping Office, as long as they have not left German territorial waters or neutral ports. As a rule, on the high seas German vessels and those neutral ships furnished with special codes can be contacted with secret instructions.

57. Blank.

Part V

Special Instructions for the Individual Operational Areas

58. Group Commanders exercise power of command in their areas for all naval tasks. They must be prepared for the event that some of the defense measures provided for in case of war (e.g., declared areas, harbor defense barrages, escort service, etc.) will be ordered even before the commencement of a state of war.

a. Instructions for the Commanding Admiral, Group East

Tasks

59. The primary duty of the Commanding Admiral, Group East lies in protecting against enemy sea and air attack the sea communications in the southern Baltic (south of 57° N) and the bases and ports on the German Baltic coast most essential to the maintenance of those sea communications.

This task can be done either by offensive or defensive measures depending on the situation. The Chief, Naval Staff will issue the necessary orders at the proper time.

The maintenance of the sea communications between East Prussia and Germany is of special significance. Other tasks are of secondary importance to the defense of this sea route when troops are being transported. The extension of permanent defense assignments to include German sea communications in the Northern Baltic (north of 57° N) is not expected for the present.

60. Further tasks of the Commanding Admiral, Group East are to control all sea communications in his command area, to inflict damage upon the enemy, and to interrupt enemy sea communications.

However, the execution of this task must not be allowed to jeopardize the performance of the duty of protecting our own sea communications in the Southern Baltic Sea.

61. The following enemy situation may be assumed:

In the Southern Baltic Sea (south of 57° N), Russia can be expected primarily to wage energetic submarine warfare with torpedoes and mines. We must reckon with the appearance of naval surface forces, principally light combat forces and fast mine carriers, and with planes, which may approach even over the territory of neutral states. In the Northern Baltic Sea (north of 57° N) and in the Gulf of Bothnia, German sea

communications and neutral sea routes running to Germany will be threatened by Russia, especially where our ships will have to leave neutral Swedish waters. We must assume that the Russians will erect a strong defense of the Gulf of Finland promptly. The principal thing will be to prevent them by our measures from emerging from the Gulf of Finland.

We must take into account the possibility of an attempt by British and French submarines to break into the Baltic Sea some time after the outbreak of war.

Poland can be expected to be hostile.

62. Execution:

I. Strategic Defense:

The thing that must be done first of all is to close the Southern Baltic Sea quickly and effectively against enemy surface operations. To achieve this aim, the Naval Staff will announce the declared area "East" and the Gjedser minefield at the proper time.

63. The fact that our store of mines is still small at present compels us to economize in the allocation of mines. For the percentages of available mines in effect at the present time, see Appendix 2 "Allocation of Mines".

The minefields to be laid with this limited number of mines should be chosen under the assumption that there will be no further allocation of mines for the time being.

Attention is directed to the possibility of increasing the effectiveness of the declared area by means of appropriate decoy movements of our combat forces or minelayers.

For blocking of the entrances to the Baltic Sea, see no. 68.

64. It is likely that, with the announcement of the declared areas, permission will be given to lay the planned anti-submarine barrage at the same time. (See A I Op 58/37 g.Kdos. Chefs. Baltic Mine Defenses. Translator's note: not included.) For mines available see Appendix 2 "Allocation of Mines".

65. The harbor defense barrage at Pillau is to be laid without special orders when general mobilization is declared.

66. In addition to carrying out the mining operations planned, it is of primary importance to prepare protective measures for the sea route Pillau - Swinemuende and to proceed with their execution as soon as a state of tension begins. Troop transports by sea are the responsibility of the Commanding Admiral, Group East, who will make the proper arrangements directly with the appropriate Army Command. The representative of Commander in Chief, Navy in East Prussia is at his disposal in the execution of these assignments.

The Commanding Admiral, Group East must attempt to report to the Naval Staff as quickly as possible when he is ready to transport the troops.

The situation will determine which method of organizing the troop transports will offer the best guarantee for a safe crossing.

67. The tasks mentioned above will temporarily take precedence over the

defense of other German sea communications in the Southern Baltic Sea. The defense of the sea communications in the Northern Baltic Sea (north of 57° N) will have to be abandoned entirely. In compensation for the loss of this protection, merchant shipping will be urged to make extensive use of neutral territorial waters, even at the cost of making detours.

68. For reasons of strategy it is especially important to keep the Baltic entrances open. In spite of this it will only be possible to maintain a relatively weak guard over the entrances to the Baltic, especially at the beginning of a war. We must put up with this situation, though fully realizing its shortcomings.

The Commanding Admiral, Group East will make the decision on the laying of mines or antisubmarine net barrages in the entrances to the Baltic Sea.

Closing of the entrances against surface forces by means of mines is provided for only in case of emergency. (Appendices 4, 5 and 6 to A I Op 58/37, g.Kdos. Chefs., Mine Defense of the Baltic Sea. Translator's note: not included.)

The number of mines necessary for the minefields cannot at present be made available for the first months of a war without interfering with other important minelaying measures.

69. Even if no forces can be made available for attacks on the Russian bases in a war on two fronts, nevertheless, if only for the sake of the necessary reconnaissance, submarines using mines and torpedoes must take the war into the enemy-controlled sea areas as far as the Gulf of Finland. There will be opportunities here, especially at the beginning of a war.

The employment of operational air forces is of the utmost importance. At the outbreak of war or very soon thereafter, Kronstadt and the Bay of Kronstadt can become operational areas of the Air Force. Demarcation of the operational areas of sea and air forces will be ordered by the Naval Staff for the beginning of the war. Group East will adapt them to changes in the situation in cooperation with the appropriate Air Force command.

70. As long as our Intelligence Service in Finland and Estonia can transmit sufficient information about the movements of Russian naval forces, we can afford, if necessary, to forego long-range reconnaissance and combat missions in the Gulf of Finland as far as Kronstadt.

71. The uncertain attitude of Poland and also of Lithuania forces us to prepare measures against these two countries. Since due to the probable war situation neither the bombardment of Gdynia by naval forces nor the laying of a strong mine barrier will be feasible, the Commanding Admiral, Group East will have to confine himself to laying mines in the approaches to the Polish bases by means of naval forces and possibly naval planes. The extent of the measures to be taken by the Navy against Gdynia will depend largely upon when we may expect Gdynia and the Polish Corridor to be occupied in the course of the campaign ashore. It can be assumed that attacks made on Polish bases by the Air Force will likewise reduce the effectiveness of Polish naval warfare.

72. In case operations by the Army and the Air Force are planned against Poland or Lithuania, the Commanding Admiral, Group East, acting on instructions from the Naval Staff, will handle cooperation between the Navy and the other branches of the Armed Forces, dealing directly

with the commands of the other two branches.

73. In a war on two fronts the Commanding Admiral, Group East must endeavor to perform his tasks with a minimum of forces by concentrating them at crucial points, and to release forces as soon as possible for naval warfare in the North Sea.

74. In cases of separate action against Poland to clarify German-Polish relations, the instructions issued to special commands for this purpose are applicable. (1/Skl Ia B Nr. 48/39 g.Kdos. Chefs. of 16 May 1939.)

75. II. Strategic offense:

In preparation.

76. - 90. Blank.

b. Instructions for the Commanding Admiral, Group West:

Tasks:

91. The tasks of naval warfare in the North Sea are:

To protect sea communications in the German Bight; to repulse assaults on the North Sea coast; to attack enemy attempts to establish a long-range blockade; to maintain sortie routes from the German Bight; to relieve naval warfare in the Atlantic by tying up a maximum of enemy forces; and to support Atlantic forces when putting to sea and returning to port.

92. Further tasks are to control our own sea communications, inflict damage upon the enemy, and interrupt his sea communications in the North Sea.

93. The point of concentration of naval warfare in the North Sea is to be shifted as soon as possible to the northern part, the area where the British may be expected to establish their blockade.

The following enemy situation may be assumed:

94. When war begins with Britain and France, German sea communications across the Atlantic will be interrupted quickly. The enemy will endeavor to establish and, as long as the war lasts, maintain, a long-range blockade from Norway to the Shetland Islands, the British Isles, and the Channel up to the French coast. It is not likely that the enemy will move this blockade closer to the German coast as long as it fulfills its purpose. We must regard the English Channel as completely blocked.

We may reckon with air attacks on German bases and naval forces, and with submarine and minelaying operations as far as the inner German Bight, and possibly even into the Kattegat and from there further into the Baltic Sea.

Neutral imports directly to German North Sea ports will shrink to a mere trickle.

Execution:

95. The combat forces and equipment which can be put at the disposal of the Commanding Admiral, Group West will not be sufficient to carry out systematically the tasks assigned.

Therefore, in order to avoid a splitting-up of forces, the following directive is issued:

96. In view of the immense superiority of the enemy, the Commanding Admiral, Group West can expect to achieve successful results with the forces available to him only through concentration of all his forces on one operation at a time. Without constant and reliable long-distance reconnaissance, however, even this method of carrying out the tasks assigned means full commitment on each occasion.

The small number of light forces and submarines available places a special responsibility for reconnaissance on the naval air forces. It is precisely in the operational area of the North Sea that naval air forces will not only have to supplement other naval means of reconnaissance but will even have to replace them to a great extent. Their allocation to the two operational areas will make due allowance for this fact.

97. An attempt must be made to render enemy mining operations against the German Bight more difficult by proclaiming the declared area "West". (A I Op 22/37 g.Kdos. Chefs., Mine Defense of the German Bight. Translator's note: not included.)

As soon as the Naval Staff has announced the declared area, it will be necessary to lay swiftly those minefields situated within the declared area which are considered especially important. Likewise submarine defense should be facilitated by quickly laying the submarine barrages considered especially important at the time.

The stock of mines at present available to the Commanding Admiral, Group West permits laying only part of the minefields planned.

The minefields are to be laid with the fact in mind that no further allocation of mines can be expected for the present. See Appendix 2 "Allocation of Mines" for the mines available at present.

98. It is especially important to defend the sea routes leading to the north flanked by the declared area, since they are the departure routes from the German Bight. The above task must take precedence over the defense of sea communications to the west, in the expectation that the latter will benefit from the protection of Dutch territorial waters, and that the island fortifications within German territory will afford a certain measure of protection against surface forces.

99. Control of the Skagerrak and Kattegat is especially important for all German war operations, in order to keep this communications link between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, which is at the same time an important point of departure for operations in the North Sea.

It will depend on the development of the situation whether the Commanding Admiral, Group West can extend his protection of sea communications up to the Skagerrak and further north. It is precisely during the opening phases of a war that this measure can make the return of merchant ships much easier.

The Naval Staff reserves the right to order the laying of minefields in the Skagerrak from its reserve of mines, as the situation may require, at the same time announcing it as a declared area, in order to facilitate control of the area.

100. Outside the sea area which can be permanently or temporarily protected by the Commanding Admiral, Group West, merchant ships will have

to be instructed to use Norwegian and Danish territorial waters even if they have to make long detours to do so.

101. Constant patrol of the exits from the North Sea must be instituted at the outbreak of war at the latest. We may count on the enemy's laying a strong barrage at the location of the "northern barrage" in the last war. This would make the northern exit practically impassable for us, considering the present ratio of strength and would make it impossible for us to lend support to our warfare in the Atlantic from home bases. Such mining intentions must be spotted and disrupted from the very beginning by the use of forces of every type. Air attacks on the bases of the mine ships by the Air Force will be called for. Energetic action by naval forces against the blockade position will interrupt the enemy's work, and at the same time will tie up enemy forces to relieve our Atlantic forces. Minelaying operations by submarines off the British bases (Scapa Flow, Cromarty, Rosyth) and in the area of the British blockade position should be considered for the purpose of interfering with British measures.

102. Naval air units are not sufficient to cope with these tasks together with others which have to be carried out by planes because of the shortage of ships. Hence, to carry out special tasks, forces of the regular Air Force will have to be requested. Insofar as these are intended for action along the east coast of Britain and in the Orkneys and Shetlands area the Commanding Admiral, Group West will arrange the details of the operation directly with the Air Force command concerned.

For the present, the Naval Staff itself will handle all coordinated action with the Air Force outside this area (e.g., on the west coast of Britain, the Irish Sea, and the Atlantic coast of France).

103. - 105. Blank.

c. Instructions for Warfare in Foreign Waters:

106. Special orders will be issued in each case governing assignments for combat forces (including auxilliary cruisers) in operation in the Atlantic. In general, warfare in foreign waters is primarily directed against goods of all kinds as far as British imports are concerned, and against troop and war material transports, as far as the French are concerned.

107. Enemy counteractivity will be especially lively on the most important sea lane, the North Atlantic route, and the merchant raiders operating in this area will be forced to take frequent evasive action.

Surprise appearances, followed by immediate withdrawal, and constant shifting of areas of activity are the prerequisites for successful action of surface forces.

Results are often attained less through individual successes than by their psychological effect. Repreated appearances made by German naval forces in the most widely varied areas will force enemy import traffic to make detours, will necessitate suspension of merchant trade on the sea routes concerned, and will discourage the readiness of neutrals to export to the enemy.

From Germany, we will endeavor to make the choice of action easier for our merchant raiders by transmitting the results of our radio intercept service.

Concentration of surface forces or close tactical cooperation with

submarines can occasionally be of practical value.

108. - 110. Blank.

111. The submarine war against merchant shipping is to be carried on first in those areas in which surface merchant raiders cannot operate (cf. no. 45). The area of operations will not have to be shifted to remote areas until enemy submarine defenses begin to exert strong pressure, permitting only occasional successes, even when our submarines are operating in full strength.

112. In view of the increased effectiveness of submarine defenses, it is not practical to concentrate all submarines in one spot, e.g., along the British east coast. Operations at widely separated points, e.g., North America, the West Indies, Cape Verdes, Gibraltar, and the Bay of Biscay, will make defense more difficult for the enemy and will offer greater prospects of success.

113. Efforts will be made in any case to dispatch submarines to the operational areas planned already during the period of tension. In order to be able to outfit these boats for long-distance operations in a short time (within 24 hours), the Commander, Submarines will order in peacetime the mobilization equipment of one third of the operational submarines in all theaters of war. Equipment with torpedoes or mines will then be ordered separately.

114. Blank.

Part VI

Instructions in Case of Sudden Outbreak of War:

115. If it should become necessary for us to open hostilities suddenly ourselves or if we are to have the necessary defenses against enemy attacks, our forces must at all times be ready for action.

Naval Mobilization Plan, para. 8 and the instructions regarding the minimum equipment in Naval Mobilization Plan Part C (see especially paras. 310, 381, 469 ff.) provide for preparing those forces for sudden use. (Translator's note: not included.)

116. In case all forces of the Navy are to be prepared for sudden action, the necessary measures will be ordered by the Naval Staff by the code word "Versammlung". The code word order will be given by telegram, radiogram or telephone to the Commanding Admiral, Group East, the other Commanding Admirals, the Fleet Commander, the Air Force General with the Commander in Chief, Navy, and the Commander, Naval Air.

The necessary steps should be taken by these staffs.

117. Execution of immediate operational defense and reconnaissance measures which may be necessary will be ordered by code-words according to the instructions for a period of tension (see Part VII). These operational measures will be carried out by peacetime stations and staffs. In the preparation of operational defense measures according to Part VII, the execution of such measures in the event of sudden outbreak of war is to be provided for as a special case.

118. Troops and population must be accustomed to a state of readiness by carrying out peacetime maneuvers. This will also be the best camouflage.

119. - 120. Blank.

Part VII

Instructions for a Period of Tension:

121. In every warlike entanglement, the first constant task of the Navy consists in the defense and surveillance of home waters primarily by regular naval forces and by naval air units, and in protection of the coastal area by the regular shore-based units.

The political situation as a whole may, however, prevent preparations from being carried out as stipulated in the regulations for a period of tension, X case, or mobilization case. Perhaps it will be possible only to issue orders to some or all of our forces for inconspicuous preparing for action at short notice.

122. Preparatory measures, which will be carried out during the various stages of a period of tension, are contained in Naval Mobilization Plan, special appendix 5 (translator's note: not included).

Operational defense measures are to be prepared independently, execution of which must not become known to those who are not concerned, even within the Armed Forces.

123. After revision of the preparatory measures of Special Appendix 5 of the Naval Mobilization Plan, the necessary forces will be provided for the separate operational defense measures by ordering the appropriate preparatory measures of Special Appendix 5 to be put into effect. Until this change has been made, the necessary measures are to be prepared as command directives of the commanders entrusted with their execution.

124. - 125. Blank.

Defense Measures:

126. There are three different degrees of defense:

First Degree of Defense:

The possibility of war breaking out is immediately imminent or a state of war on the frontiers has already begun. For political reasons, however, public alarm is not to be awakened by any conspicuous defense measures along the frontiers not directly affected by the hostilities.

127. Measures for the First Degree:

(For regulations governing the execution of defense measures see Appendix 3.)

a. Measure "Ulla":

Inconspicuous patrolling of the North Sea by submarines in the direction of the Channel and the Thames Estuary.

b. Measure "Ulfilas":

Inconspicuous patrolling of the Baltic Sea by submarines in the direction of the Gulf of Finland.

c. Measure "Ursula":

Simultaneous execution of measures "Ulla" and "Ulfilas".

d. Measure "Falke":

Inconspicuous air reconnaissance over the North Sea in the direction of the Channel (focal point) and in the direction of Scotland and the Shetlands.

e. Measure "Fink":

Inconspicuous air reconnaissance over the Baltic Sea as far as the entrance to the Gulf of Finland.

f. Measure "Feodora":

Simultaneous execution of measures "Falke" and "Fink".

Second Degree of Defense:

128. The political situation requires stronger preliminary defense measures without, however, transcending the limits of a defense of the sea frontier to be normally expected in a critical situation. (No mobilization of the Navy, execution of measures only by means of forces in service.)

The measures taken for the first degree of defense may have preceded the above measures independently, if they did not commence simultaneously. If they are carried out at the same time as the measures of the second degree, they are to continue to be carried on inconspicuously in the future, insofar as they go beyond the limits of the German coastal waters.

129. Measures of the Second Degree of Defense:

Tasks:

a. Measure "Carla":

Patrolling of the German Bight by naval forces roughly up to a line Terschelling-Hornsriff.

b. Measure "Carin":

Preparation and patrolling of the sea route Pillau - Germany for troop transports.

c. Measure "Corso":

Simultaneous execution of measures "Carla" and "Carin".

d. Measure "Zubringer":

Requisitioning and outfitting of the transport ships necessary for transporting troops from East Prussia to Germany.

130. Upon issue of orders "Carla", "Carin" or "Corso", command organization for mobilization goes into effect immediately. Operational staffs not yet in existence in peacetime are to be set up immediately, as provided for in measure "Aufbau". (See para. 140 and Appendix 4.)

131. The Naval High Command will order a state of war readiness of naval forces and execution of the measures of the first and second degree of defense in two stages by means of supplementary code words:

First state, supplementary code word "Sonderappell"; establishment of

state of war readiness.

Second stage, supplementary code word "Sonderkommando": execution of defense measures. (See Appendix 6.)

132. Defense measures are to be carried out under the instructions given in accordance with Appendix 3, "Regulations for carrying out defense measures", whereby the order to establish a state of war readiness (code word "Sonderappell") in the case of measures "Carla", "Carin", and "Corso" includes the assembling and transferring of the allotted forces to the area they are ordered to patrol.

133. Distribution of forces:

The Groups will have at their disposal primarily those forces allocated in accordance with Appendix 1, "Allocation of forces".

The Naval Staff will issue orders concerning the use of training and experimental vessels, as well as ships in trials.

Ships covered by the mobilization regulations (auxilliary vessels) which are in service when the order is issued will be available for operations according to where they are stationed.

134. The Group Commanders are to take care that during the transition to a "period of tension" or "mobilization" adequate defenses are maintained, in case such orders are given while measures of first and second degree defense are in progress.

135. Blank.

Third Degree of Defense:

136. The development of the political situation no longer permits defense measures to be limited to regular forces only. The augmented measures which will result from this situation will be ordered as "preparatory measures" (according to Special Appendix 5 of Naval Mobilization Plan. Translator's note: not included), unless general mobilization has been ordered.

137. When these measures are instituted we can reckon with the imminent outbreak of war. Naval Group Commanders must be able to carry out immediately the tasks devolving on them when war breaks out.

With the present ratio of strength of our forces to that of our potential enemies, everything depends on our carrying out the necessary defense measures in home waters at once and with the greatest possible speed in order to be secure against surprise attacks.

138. - 139. Blank.

140. Measure "Aufbau":

In order to ensure the smooth working of the operations staffs at all times, especially of the staffs not yet in existence in peacetime, and also of the communications organizations, the mobilization command organization will be set up as far as possible even before the second degree of defense, by means of measure "Aufbau" (see appendix 4).

141. Measure "Oertlicher Flakschutz":

In order to ensure that certain of the antiaircraft defenses in the German coastal area are ready for immediate action, all antiaircraft

batteries, searchlights, listening apparatus, etc., for which regular personnel is available will be ordered manned by means of measure "Oertlisher Flakschutz" (see Appendix 5).

(Handwritten note: Former code word "Flackerfeuer" changed to "Oertlicher Flakschutz" to agree with the Air Force's code word for this measure.)

142. The execution of the measures planned will be ordered by the Naval Staff by means of the prearranged code words ("Ulla", etc.) via telegram, radiogram, and telephone messages to the Commanding Admiral, Group East, the other Commanding Admirals, the Fleet Commander, the Air Force General with the Commander in Chief, Navy, and the Commander, Naval Air. The measures ordered by these code words will be initiated in the guise of a practice alarm upon orders by the Commanding Admiral, Group East or the Admiral, Naval Station North Sea. (See Appendix 7 for regulations concerning preparations for these measures.)

143. Special communications regulations come into force simultaneously with the execution of measures of defense of the first to the third degrees. (See Appendix 9 for communications regulations.)

Appendices (Translator's note: not included.)

1. Allocation of Forces
2. Allocation of Mines
3. Regulations for Carrying out Defense Measures
4. Measure "Aufbau"
5. Measure "Oertlicher Flakschutz"
6. Stages of Readiness
7. Regulations for Preparation of Defense Measures
8. Communications Instructions and Recognition Signal Procedure for Defense Measures
9. Instructions on Conduct with Regard to International Law
10. Special Instructions for Merchant Ships
11. List of Code Words

The Commander in Chief, Navy
1/Skl. Ia Op 48/39 Gkdos. Chefs.

Berlin, 15 May 1939

Copy 9

Top secret

Re: Directive for operation "Weiss"

(Translator's note: Sections I, II, and III are identical with Annex II (Operation "Weiss") of Hitler's directive of 11 Apr. 1938.)

IV. Directive of the Commander in Chief, Navy

I issue the following directives for carrying out the naval operations:

1. The great German superiority compared to the Polish forces during operation "Weiss" should be utilized to carry out the task assigned to the Navy so suddenly and so forcefully that it will be entirely and definitely completed in as short a time as possible.

2. Command authority

I place the Commanding Admiral, Group East in charge of naval preparations, operations, and defense measures, inclusive of the naval

air forces in the Baltic Sea.

Insofar as necessary, cooperation with Army Group Command I, Berlin is to be assured. I appoint the Commanding Admiral, Scouting Forces (B.d.A.) as Naval Commander, East (Seebefehlshaber Ost).

I place the Commanding Admiral, Naval Station North Sea in charge of naval preparations and defense measures, inclusive of the naval air forces in the North Sea.

3. The first naval operations against Poland

a. Departure date for neutral shipping.

The first measures will be influenced to a great extent by the departure time for neutral shipping ordered in the Fuehrer directive.

This time is to be set for 10 hours after Y time.

The Naval Staff will attend to informing neutral shipping in Gdynia about this deadline at Y time.

b. Barrage operations against Gdynia.

Plans are to be made for a PT boat flotilla to lay standard mines, type B (RMB) in the harbor entrance of Gdynia at Y time. The mines are to be laid with delay mechanism set for 12 hours in view of the departure deadline. The extra 2 hours are to prevent neutral steamers leaving at the last minute from suffering damage. The Commander in Chief, Navy will arrange for equipping the mines with a delay mechanism set for a maximum of 12 hours from the time they are laid.

At Y time naval air forces will pretend to attack Gdynia for the purpose of diverting attention so that the PT boat operation can be carried out more readily.

Destroyers will provide protection for the PT boats on the way to and from the operation.

Plans are to be made for submarines to lay another mine barrage further out to sea to supplement the barrage at the harbor entrance and in case the PT boats should not be able to carry out their operation because of the weather or other reasons. In view of the diving ability of the submarines this minefield can be laid on either side of the 20 meter line. The delay mechanism is to be set so that these mines will also become active twelve hours after Y time, no matter when they are laid.

Plans are to be made for naval air forces to drop mines in order further to block off the area already mined by the submarines toward the Polish coast south and north of Gdynia. This operation should be carried out at dusk of the evening following Y time at the earliest. I shall issue the order for dropping the aerial mines.

c. Mining measures against the harbors of the Hela peninsula

The following harbors, which are small but usable for military purposes, should be mined with torpedo mines, type B (TMB) at Y time with one submarine each:

(1) Hela submarine harbor
(2) Hela fishing harbor
(3) Heisternest
(4) Grossendorf

Since in these harbors no consideration need be given neutral shipping, these mines will be laid without delay mechanism.

Since the submarines will have to surface in order to lay the mines in the last part of the harbor entrances where the water is shallow, the Commander in Chief, Air has been asked to launch heavy air raids on the land installations of the harbors and the fortifications of the Hela peninsula at Y time, in case of strong Polish defense activity, in order to divert attention from the harbor entrances. Danger to our submarines as a result of the air raids is to be eliminated through the necessary agreements with the Air Force.

Depending on the situation and the results of reconnaissance on the day prior to Y day, I myself shall issue the orders to mine the Hela harbors.

d. Blockade of Danzig Bay

Since the Polish naval forces, insofar as they are ready for action and are in Gdynia harbor at Y time, can likewise leave the harbor during the departure time for neutral shipping before our minefields become active, we must supplement the barrages with a blockade of Danzig Bay. For this purpose the following preparations should be made:

(1). The submarines participating in the mining off Gdynia and the Hela harbors should be stationed along the assumed routes of the Polish naval forces southeast and north of the Hela peninsula after they have carried out their mining missions, or already at Y time if their mining missions are cancelled. It is the task of these submarines to watch and report Polish naval forces as well as to attack them and merchant ships in accordance with section IV, no. 5a of this directive.

(2) Outside of the above-mentioned line of submarines, a patrol line should be stationed close enough together to prevent surface forces from slipping through even in the dark. Cruisers and destroyers should be stationed behind the submarines. Particular attention should be paid to danger from submarines.

By day Danzig Bay should also be watched in such a way that Polish surface forces cannot break out.

The length of the blockade will depend on the development of the situation, especially on further information concerning the whereabouts of the Polish forces.

(3) There should be extensive air reconnaissance of the central and southern Baltic Sea from dawn of Y day until the situation has been clarified, in order quickly to establish the positions of Polish naval vessels which are at sea at Y time or of Polish submarines which depart during the time allowed for neutral shipping, so that naval forces and naval air forces can be sent to attack them.

e. Attacks by the Air Force

The Commander in Chief, Air should plan to destroy the Polish naval air forces through attacks on the naval airport Putzig, the alternate ports of Heisternest and Hela, as well as the airfields Rahmel and Janowo, as soon as possible after Y time.

For attacks on the Hela peninsula see no. 3c.

f. Air defense

The Commander in Chief, Air has been asked to increase the defenses of Pillau and the Koenigsberg Sea Channel against Polish

reprisals.

g. Other defense measures against Polish naval forces at sea:

Polish surface forces must be kept from breaking out of the Baltic Sea. Therefore sufficiently strong forces should be stationed at the southern exit of the Sound.

The Gjedser Strait is to be patrolled.

Submarines are to patrol Libau and the Irbe Strait to establish whether Polish forces put into Latvian harbors, and are to attack them.

h. Preliminary plans of the Naval Staff

The preliminary plans concerning these operations are appended so that they can be used during preparations. (Translator's note: Not included.)

4. Defense measures against intervention of foreign powers in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea

a. The defense of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea is to be prepared according to measures "Ursula" and "Feodora" of the "Preliminary Battle Instructions" as far as the available forces permit. Measure "Ursula" is to be supplemented by submarine patrol of the Baltic Sea entrances approximately at the latitude of Laesoe, as well as of Libau harbor and the Irbe Strait (see no. 3g). It should be investigated whether submarines of the submarine school should be used for the task in the Kattegat. Special care should be taken to keep such defense measures secret in the vicinity of foreign coasts.

b. As protection against enemy air activity, measure "Flackerfeuer" (Translator's note: changed by marginal note to "Oerticher Flakschutz"), reinforced particularly in the German Bight by a seaplane reporting service consisting of auxiliary and reserve forces, will go into effect.

c. In order to increase the readiness of the coastal defenses, it is planned to stage constant reserve maneuvers centered at Pillau and the Kiel Canal for the plane reporting service as well as for air defenses. The necessary measures will be ordered by the High Command.

5. Attitude of our forces

a. Beginning at Y time all Polish naval, air, and land forces, as well as all Polish merchant ships will be treated as hostile. Polish merchant ships, insofar as possible, should be brought into German harbors. They are to be sunk only if they cannot be prevented from entering Polish harbors or neutral waters, or if for other reasons they cannot be brought into German ports; if sunk, due consideration must be given to regulations governing rescue of crew, passengers, and papers. The submarines stationed in Danzig Bay will be permitted to attack without warning Polish and neutral merchant vessels which have broken through the blockade, keeping up the pretense of mine hits - the neutral ships not until after Y time plus 14 hours, however. Polish and neutral steamers under Polish armed escort may be sunk without warning at any time after Y time.

Neutral steamers destined for Neufahrwasser or Danzig should be diverted

to Pillau and Koenigsberg at first. The time when they will be permitted to enter Neufahrwasser, perhaps under escort, will depend on the development of the situation.

b. Contact is to be maintained as inconspicuously as possible with Polish forces and merchant ships which are encountered prior to Y time, insofar as the mine and blockade operations permit. Hostilities should not be started before Y time, unless the enemy does so. If necessary, however, armed force should be used to carry out the mining operation.

c. It is not planned to attack neutral merchant vessels at first, except those which break through the blockade or proceed under Polish escort (see no. 4a). Neutral ships which actually or supposedly are not aware of the blockade of Gdynia and head for this harbor are to be forbidden by the blockade forces to proceed to Gdynia, beginning with Y time. If necessary, armed force will be used to enforce this command.

d. The Naval Staff will prepare the text of the declaration announcing the blockade of the Polish coast and the mining of Polish harbors at Y time. Since it is advisable not to permit a state of war to appear to exist formally, this declaration will probably differ from a regular blockade declaration or mine warning.

e. The territorial waters of neutral countries should be respected. According to the government's desire to confine the conflict to Poland, the territorial waters claimed by the various neutral countries should be accepted. In the case of Sweden, Estonia, and Finland these waters are 4 miles wide (Aaland Islands 3 miles), and in the case of Denmark, Latvia, and Lithuania, 3 miles.

I forbid any kind of combat and naval measures within these waters except in defense against an enemy attack.

The regulation in the neutrality declarations of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, which forbids submarines from passing through their territorial waters except at the Baltic Sea entrances, should be respected.

6. German merchant shipping

German merchant shipping in the Baltic Sea should be held back at first in German or neutral harbors or ordered to return to such harbors until the situation concerning the Polish naval forces has been clarified. No warning should be issued prior to Y time.

Further measures, such as permission for shipping to resume, formation of convoys, etc., must depend on the development of the situation. An attempt will be made to confine suspension of shipping to as short a time as possible.

7. Distribution of forces

a. The following forces will be placed under the command of Group East for operation "Weiss" according to Section IV, no. 3: 3 cruisers, 2 destroyer flotillas, all torpedo boat flotillas inclusive of torpedo-training flotillas, 1 escort flotilla, 1 PT boat flotilla, 5 submarines type VII or VII b, 4 submarines type II, and at least 2 submarines type II to patrol Libau and Riga, 3 submarines (of the submarine school) to patrol the Laesoe area, up to 2 supply ships as requested by Group East, naval air forces of the Baltic Sea area, as well

as 1 multipurpose squadron from the North Sea area. The choice should be made in agreement with the Fleet and the Commander, Naval Air.

b. Measures "Ursula" and "Feodora" should be carried out with the forces which are still available.

c. The pocket battleships, with 1 or 2 supply ships and the remaining submarines, are to be equipped for Atlantic warfare and to be held in readiness in the North Sea harbors. It is planned to send them into the operations area prior to Y day and to equip them accordingly in time.

The battleships will remain in readiness in the North Sea.

d. Since readiness for operation "Weiss" will probably have to be maintained for some time it is not sure that the forces mentioned under no. 6a (Translator's note: evidently should be 7a) will be usable at all times.

Group East therefore should make plans for the operations in such a way that if necessary they can be carried out with fewer forces with certain limitations. The minimum of forces needed should be determined. The Naval High Command is planning to take measures for keeping the minimum forces needed constantly in readiness.

8. Y time, period of preparation, and assembly

a. Y time can be expected to be in the early morning hours, 2 hours before it becomes light (3 hours before sunrise). The Navy requested this time as necessary for the planned measures, and it has been accepted by the Armed Forces High Command.

b. Since peacetime training is to be maintained on a large scale and early detection of the planned measures is to be avoided, a 48 hour warning period (period of preparation) may be expected. Thus Y day and Y time will probably be set 48 hours in advance.

Preparations therefore should be made to such an extent that the measures to be carried out at Y time can be carried out 48 hours after receipt of the order by Group East.

c. Assembly

A concentration of the forces earmarked for the operations near the operations area during the 48 hour period of preparation should be avoided. They should be stationed as inconspicuously as possible along the entire coast according to their speed singly or in groups in such a way that they can reach the spots assigned to them with certainty by Y time.

9. Measures during a period of tension prior to operation "Weiss"

It is especially important during a period of tension prior to operation "Weiss" to watch the movements and activities of Polish naval forces.

In this case the measures designated by code word "Transportuebung Luebeck" become effective.

V. Deadline for the preparations

According to the Fuehrer directive, preparations for operation "Weiss"

are to be carried out in such a manner that the operation can take place at any time after 1 Sep. 1939.

Since on the basis of the latest political developments it is not certain, however, whether the government might not be forced to carry out the operation at an earlier date, the preparations should be accelerated as much as possible. Therefore the directives and orders of the Commanding Admiral, Group East should be submitted to me by 15 June.

signed: Raeder

Armed Forces High Command
WFA Nr. 67/39 g.Kdos. L (I)

Berlin 24 June 1939

No. 2 of five copies

Top secret

Re: Operation "Weiss"

The Army High Command is ordered to take all measures necessary to capture the bridges across the lower Vistula undamaged. When these preparations are completed, the Army High Command is to make a brief comprehensive report to the Armed Forces High Command.

Furthermore the Army and Naval High Commands are to investigate whether advance preparations by the Navy in the Bay of Danzig can jeopardize surprise operations against the **Dirschau** bridge. Considering the importance of the bridge, it should be determined whether Army approval given some time ago to planned measures of the Navy (minefields to be laid prior to Y time) will be upheld.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

[redacted]

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 31 Aug. 1939

OKW/WFA Nr. 170/39 g.K.Chefs.LI — No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

Directive No. 1

for the Conduct of the War

1. All political means having been exhausted to correct in a peaceful manner the unbearable situation on Germany's eastern border, I have decided upon a solution by force.

2. The attack against Poland is to be carried out according to preparations for operation "Weiss", with the modifications resulting from the Army's having been almost completely deployed in the meantime.

The assignment of missions and the operational objective remain unchanged.

Date of attack 1 Sep. 1939 (date inserted)

Time of attack.....(*)

This time will also apply with regard to the operations at Gdynia and the Gulf of Danzig, and at the Dirschau bridge.

3. In the West it is important to leave the responsibility for opening hostilities unmistakably to Britain and France. Minor border violations are for the time being to be countered with purely local actions.

The assurances of neutrality given by us to the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Switzerland are to be meticulously observed.

The western border of Germany must not be crossed by land at any place, without my explicit authorization.

The same applies at sea for all hostile actions or any which can be so construed.

The defensive measures of the Air Force are, for the time being, to be limited entirely to repulsing enemy air attacks at the Reich border. The borders of neutral states are to be respected as long as possible in warding off single aircraft or small formations. Only when air protection is no longer assured in the West on account of the employment against German territory of stronger French and British attacking forces over neutral countries, is defense over neutral territory to be permitted also.

It is particularly important that any violation of the neutrality of these countries by the enemy in the West should be speedily reported to the Armed Forces High Command.

4. Should Britain and France begin hostilities against Germany, it will be the duty of the armed forces operating in the West to ensure the victorious conclusion of the operations against Poland, although

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* According to the War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Part A, Vol. 1, page 23, the time was 0445.

conserving their forces as much as possible. Within these limits, the enemy forces and their economic resources are to be damaged as much as possible. I reserve for myself the right to order offensive actions in all cases.

The Army will hold the Westwall, and will be prepared to prevent the Western Powers from flanking it in the north, through violation of Belgian or Dutch territory. If French forces move into Luxemburg, the bridges at the frontier may be blown up.

The Navy will carry out the war on merchant shipping with Britain as the focal point. For intensification of the effect, the declaration of danger zones can be expected. The Naval High Command is to report in what waters and to what degree the establishment of danger zones is considered advisable. The text of a public declaration is to be prepared in collaboration with the Foreign Office, and is to be submitted for my approval through the Armed Forces High Command.

The Baltic Sea is to be protected against enemy penetration. The Commander in Chief, Navy will decide whether the entrances to the Baltic may be mined for this purpose.

The Air Force is, first of all, to prevent the employment of the French and British air forces against the German Army and the German lebensraum.

In the strategy against Britain, preparations are to be made for the Air Force to disrupt Britain's imports, her armament industry, and her troop transports to France. Any favorable opportunity for an effective attack against massed vessels of the British fleet, especially battleships and aircraft carriers, is to be utilized. The decision regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on British home territory are to be prepared, bearing in mind that inconclusive results with insufficient forces are to be avoided under all circumstances.

signed: Adolf Hitler

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 3 Sep. 1939

OKW/WFA Nr. 175/39 g.K.Chefs. L I — No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

Directive No. 2 for the Conduct of the War.

1. Following a declaration of war by the British Government, the British Admiralty issued orders on 3 Sep. 1939 at 1117 to open hostilities.

France has announced that commencing 3 Sep. 1939 at 1700, she will consider herself at war with Germany.

2. The immediate aim of German strategy remains the quick and victorious termination of operations against Poland.

Troop transfers of any size from the East to the West are subject to my decision.

3. The principles laid down in Directive No. 1 for operations in the West remain unchanged.

The opening of hostilities as announced by Britain and the French declaration of a state of war will have the following consequences:

a. With regard to Great Britain:

Navy

Offensive actions are now permissible. For the time being, also the submarines are to observe prize regulations in operations against merchant shipping. Plans for intensified measures leading to the declaration of danger zones are to be prepared, but I reserve to myself the decision as to the time when these measures are to become effective.

The Baltic Sea entrances are to be mined without violating neutral territorial waters.

In the North Sea the blockade measures planned for our defense and for attacks on Britain are to be carried out.

Air Force

Offensive operations against British naval forces at naval bases or on the high seas (including the English Channel), as well as against clearly recognized troop transports, are permitted only after the British have resorted to similar air action against comparable targets, and if the prospects for success are particularly favorable. The same applies to the naval air units.*

I reserve to myself the decision with regard to attacks upon the British homeland and against merchant vessels.

b. With regard to France:

Army

The opening of hostilities in the West is to be left to the enemy. The Commander in Chief, Army will decide as to reinforcement of the Army in the West from reserves still available.

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* Translator's note: a subsequent order was issued on 6 Sep. 1939 by the Armed Forces High Command: "Re: assignment of naval air units insert under Air Force after naval air units: 'These limitations will not be observed in the German Bight, in the western declared mine area, and during actions in direct support of naval operations.'"

Navy

Offensive operations against France are permissible only after France has opened hostilities. If this occurs, the instructions given for operations against Britain are likewise applicable to France.

Air Force

Offensive operations against France are permissible only after French attacks on German territory. The guiding principle must be not to provoke the beginning of air warfare through German measures. In general, the assignment of Air Force units in the West should be such as to preserve their striking power for decisive action against the Western Powers after Poland has been defeated.

4. The X order issued on 25 Aug. 1939 in OKW Nr. 2100/39, g.K. WFA/L IIc is hereby extended to the entire Armed Forces, effective 3 Sep. 1939.

The entire national economy is ordered to convert to a wartime basis.

Additional mobilization measures in the civilian sector will be introduced by the Armed Forces High Command upon request of the highest government authorities.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 9 Sep. 1939

OKW/WFA Nr. 200/39 g.K.Chefs. L I

No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

Directive No. 3 for the Conduct of the War.

1. Operations in strength against the Polish army and air force are to be continued until it is safe to assume that the Poles can no longer succeed in establishing a continuous front which would tie down the German forces.

2. When it becomes apparent that parts of the Eastern Army and of the Air Force are no longer required for this mission and for crushing resistance in the occupied territories, arrangements are to be made for their transfer to the West. Additional air defense units may be assigned for operation against our enemy in the West as the Polish air force loses more and more of its effectiveness.

3. Even after the irresolute opening of hostilities by Great Britain at sea and in the air, and by France on land and in the air, my express

consent must be obtained in each of the following cases:

a. Every time our ground forces cross the western borders of Germany.

b. Every time one of our planes crosses the western borders of Germany, unless this is required to repulse enemy air attacks in force.

c. For every air attack on Britain.

The Air Force may, however, be employed in the German Bight, over the declared mine area in the West, and in direct support of naval operations.

d. For the Navy the regulations laid down in Directive No. 2, paragraphs 3a and 3b, remain in force. No offensive actions at sea are to be undertaken against France.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

OKW Nr. 205/39 g.Kdos. WFA/L I

Fuehrer Headquarters
25 Sep. 1939

No. 2 of seven copies

Top secret

Directive No. 4 for the Conduct of the War.

1. No final decision has yet been made regarding the political future of the erstwhile Polish territories between the line of demarcation and the German frontier.

After the conclusion of the battles around Warsaw and Modlin, the line of demarcation is to be safeguarded adequately by less heavily equipped units.

Sufficient Army and Air Force units are to be left in the East to put a quick end to Polish resistance continuing behind the line of demarcation (San-Vistula-Narew-Pisia). I request a report regarding the strength of forces earmarked for both of these tasks.

2. I shall decide later, in accordance with the results of local attacks and attrition warfare, on whether Modlin and the part of Warsaw west of the Vistula are to be taken by a general attack before 3 Oct. However, this attack is to be prepared.

3. The flow of refugees from the east across the line of demarcation is to be stopped immediately, with the exception of ethnic German elements and Ukrainian activists.

4. The decision regarding the future strategy of the war will be issued shortly.

Up to that time the measures of the Armed Forces with regard to organization and armament are to be such as will not conflict with any possible decision. The possibility must be kept open for an offensive in the West at any time.

In East Prussia sufficient forces must be kept in readiness to occupy Lithuania quickly, even in the case of armed resistance.

5. a. On land the instructions given for the war in the West will, for the time being, remain in effect.

b. At sea the former limitations are cancelled, and warfare on merchant shipping is to be conducted against France as well as Britain in accordance with prize law.

In addition the following operations may be carried out: Attacks upon French naval and air forces, French merchant vessels in convoy, and all troop transports; mining operations off the North African coast (embarkation points);* war on merchant shipping by naval air units, in accordance with prize law.

As heretofore, no attacks are to be made on liners or large steamers which are evidently carrying passengers in large numbers in addition to goods.

c. In the air, in the West, the limitations hitherto prevailing remain in force. Flights beyond the German border are permitted only for short-range or combat reconnaissance and for attacks upon artillery liaison planes and captive balloons. The Air Force may also carry out operations in the German Bight, in the western declared mine areas, and in direct support of naval operations against British or French naval units.

Permission for long-range reconnaissance will be given at a later date.

6. With regard to submarine warfare, from now on only the following designations are to be used:

For submarine warfare in compliance with prize law: Warfare against merchant shipping.

For unrestricted submarine warfare: Naval siege of the British Isles.

7. British merchant vessels**which are armed beyond any doubt may be attacked by submarines without warning.

signed: Adolf Hitler

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* Pencilled marginal note: "Should read: North French coast (debarkation points). Naval Staff, Operations Branch."

** Marginal note: "Superseded by Directive No. 5"

[redacted]

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 30 Sep. 1939

OKW. Nr. 171/39 g.K. Chefs. WFA/L I — No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

Directive No. 5

1. As the result of the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of 28 Sep. 1939 with Russia, it is intended to regulate the political organization of the former Polish territories within the German sphere of interest according to the following guiding principles:

a. The new political frontier of the Reich in the East will, in general, include the former German-colonized area and, in addition, those territories which are especially valuable for reasons of military expediency, war economy, or communications.

The final demarcation line has not yet been settled in detail. I request that suggestions on this subject be submitted to me through the Armed Forces High Command.

b. The present line of demarcation (Pisia-Narew-Vistula-San) will be constantly strengthened as a military security belt towards the East. The required garrisons are also to be permanently located beyond the German political frontier.

I likewise request suggestions regarding location of this security line in detail, to be submitted to me through the Armed Forces High Command.

c. The line laid down according to the Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, the details of which are expected to be settled by a supplementary protocol, is to be considered the limit of the German sphere of interest as far as Russia is concerned.

d. I myself shall set up the political organization of the territory between this line and the new political boundary of the German Reich.

2. First of all, the entire territory of the former Polish state, up to the line established in the Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty and including the Suwalki triangle, will be organized under a Military Government controlled by the Commander in Chief, Army.

I request the Commander in Chief, Army to submit to me at an early date the measures required for bringing about the following:

a. The pacification of the territories to be occupied. The time will be settled after the conclusion of the Moscow agreements.

b. The occupation of the security line along the former line of demarcation.

c. The occupation of the entire territory by occupation troops. This mission is to be accomplished east of the military security line with minimum forces after pacification has been completed.

The Commander in Chief, Air will leave in the East the forces required by the Commander in Chief, Army for this mission.

d. The subdivision of the military government territory into districts or else the extension of existing military government districts

to include the newly acquired territories.

3. On the basis of the latest political developments, the troops intended for East Prussia in accordance with Directive No. 4, paragraph 4, last sentence, do not need to be held in readiness.

4. The restrictions hitherto prevailing for naval warfare against France are cancelled. The war at sea is to be fought against France just as against Britain.

The war against merchant shipping is, on the whole, to be fought according to prize law, with the following exceptions:

Merchantmen and troop ships recognized beyond doubt as hostile may be attacked without warning.

The same applies to ships sailing without lights in the waters around the British Isles.

Armed force is to be employed against merchantmen which use their radio transmitters when stopped.

As before, no attacks are to be made upon passenger vessels or large steamships as appear to be carrying passengers in large numbers as well as goods.

5. For air warfare in the West the restrictions in force until now will remain in effect. Flights across the Reich border are permitted for short-range and combat reconnaissance, for attacks upon artillery liaison planes and captive balloons, and, to a limited degree, for long-range reconnaissance for the Commander in Chief, Air. The Army's requests for long-range reconnaissance are to be handled through direct cooperation between Army and Air Force.

Furthermore, the Air Force is authorized to carry out offensive actions in the North Sea against British and French naval forces at sea, and to carry on the war against merchant shipping according to prize law.

6. The orders under paragraphs 4 and 5 will replace paragraphs 5b, 5c, and 7 of Directive No. 4 for the Conduct of the War.

signed: Adolf Hitler

countersigned: Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command Keitel

[redacted]

Berlin, 9 Oct. 1939

Memorandum and Guiding Principles for Directing the War in the West

The contents of this memorandum are meant only for the personal information of the Commanders in Chief and the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command. They will be responsible for secrecy.

Distribution:

1. The Commander in Chief, Army, General von Brauchitsch
2. The Commander in Chief, Navy, Admiral Raeder
3. The Commander in Chief, Air, Field Marshal Goering
4. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command, General Keitel

The dissolution of the first German Reich sealed by the peace of Muenster of 1648 resulted in the European order which made possible the creation of the French and particularly of the British Empire, resulting in a so-called balance of power. The most important characteristic of this situation, desired by England, was that it split up the German peoples and prevented by treaties a later reunion into a unified state. Every attempt to reestablish such a state of the German peoples in Europe was therefore considered as upsetting the European balance of power and was opposed. Also British friendship towards Prussia - what there was of it - cooled off as soon as Prussia became aware of its German mission and tried to establish a new German state under its leadership. Both Bismarck and Moltke therefore recognized with prophetic vision that the new Reich created by them would probably at some later time have to defend itself against those interested in maintaining the European balance, and thus finally establish itself. The World War, set off by an incident unimportant in itself, was meant to smash this union once more and to eliminate in advance any possibility for a future reunion of the German peoples on a larger scale.

Also the present war of the western powers against the new German Reich serves the same purpose. It is the aim of Franco-British warfare to dissolve and destroy the state of 80,000,000 people in order to reestablish in this manner the European balance of power, which is in their interest. The German people therefore must go through this struggle at some time or other. Nevertheless the very great successes of the first few months of the war could serve to strengthen the Reich psychologically and materially in case of an immediate peace, and therefore from the German point of view there would be no objections against ending the war if the peace would not undo the successes gained by our arms.

It is not the purpose of this memorandum, however, to explore or even to consider the possibilities in this direction. I shall concern myself exclusively with the other alternative, namely continuation of the war. The aim of this war, as far as our enemies are concerned, is to dissolve and destroy the German Reich, as already stated. The German war aim, on the other hand, must be to eliminate completely the military power of the West, that is, to destroy the strength and the ability of the western powers once more to oppose a consolidation of the German peoples as a state and their further development in Europe.

This real aim must, however, undergo from time to time propagandistic corrections toward the outside world for psychological reasons. Nevertheless the war aim itself is unchanged. It is and remains the destruction of our western enemies.

The German Situation

The German people is entering this war with more than twice the population of France, and almost the same as France and Britain combined.

This strength is being utilized at present in a military way to such an extent that it cannot be essentially improved, at any rate not within a short time. France will not be able to compensate for the increase in military strength which is to be expected during the coming years, but Britain will continue to grow stronger. France herself is not in a position to set up more than a certain number of new units, considering the weakness of her age classes, unless she disregards the reserves necessary to replace losses. Britain is able to organize a large number of new units in the coming months or years, which will be more of defensive than operational value, however.

The Time Factor

As in all historical events, in this war time is not a factor which is valuable in itself, but in the use which is made of it. As the situation stands, time is more likely to be an ally of the western powers than of us.

The Reasons

The successes of the Polish campaign have created the possibility of waging a one-front war, a possibility desired for many centuries without prospect of realization. This means that Germany, leaving a few covering troops in the east, can throw her entire strength into the fight in the west.

The remaining European states are neutral either because of anxiety about their own fate, lack of interest in the conflict, or interest in a certain outcome of the war which precludes their putting in an appearance too soon or at all.

The following should be remembered in this connection:

Russia

A lasting neutrality of Soviet Russia cannot be guaranteed with certainty through any treaty or any agreement. At the present time everything indicates that she will not abandon this neutrality. In six months, a year, or several years this attitude can change. The insignificant value of treaties has been proved on all sides, especially in the last years. The greatest security from any sort of Russian interference lies in unmistakable German superiority and in quickly demonstrating German strength.

Italy

As long as the Italian government regards the future of Italy in the light of restoring a great imperial Roman Empire, it will tend in general to lean in the direction of Germany, since this imperial aim can only be realized at the cost of France or Britain, and only with the help of Germany or in connection with German successes. Fascism, and in particular its creator, Benito Mussolini, is the bearer of this imperial aim. If the Fascist influence in Italy were weakened or if the Duce should die this would lead to a strengthening of the influence of court circles, and therewith in the last analysis to a rejection of this aim, which is based on the people but is disagreeable, because it is dangerous, to dynasties. As surely as Mussolini is seeking to

fight with the democracies, and would do so if the circumstances were favorable, just as surely non-Fascist Italy, particularly the court, rejects this sort of dangerous thinking. They will not be willing to intervene actively along these lines. At the most they will stand aside and let developments take their course, which would be most favorable for us. However for a little remuneration these circles will also be willing to sell the Italian birthright in the Mediterranean in their foolish short-sightedness and go with the enemies of Germany. Germany's hope for Italian assistance in her fateful war is therefore dependent on the strength of the Fascist influence in that country and thus essentially on the life of the Duce. Therefore the time factor here can under no circumstances be considered as an ally of Germany; rather it is dangerous to us.

Belgium and Holland.

Both countries are interested in keeping their neutrality, but they are incapable of resisting lasting pressure by Britain and France. Safeguarding of their overseas possessions and of their commerce, and thus of their internal economy, even their very life, is completely in the hands of Britain and France. Both countries are therefore to the highest degree dependent on the West in their decisions, their attitudes, and their actions. If France and Britain see an advantage in sacrificing Belgian neutrality, they are in a position at any time to exercize the necessary pressure. That is, they can, without burdening themselves with the odium of violating neutrality, force Belgium and Holland to give up their neutrality. Therefore also with regard to maintaining Belgian-Dutch neutrality, time is not a factor which could promise a favorable development for Germany.

The Scandinavian Countries

If entirely unforeseen factors do not enter in, it is probable that they will remain neutral also in the future. It would seem possible for Germany to continue to carry on commerce with these countries even if the war lasts for some time.

The Southeastern Countries

At the present time it is very probable that they will be neutral, but it is not altogether sure that they will remain so. Not only psychological and propagandistic influences and general economic factors, but also personal financial bribery may cause these countries to change at any time.

America

The attempt of certain circles in the U.S. to make the Continent hostile to Germany is definitely unsuccessful at the present time, but may have the desired result in the future. Also in this instance time works against Germany.

East Asia

Japan's attitude will be determined purely by her own interest; she will attempt to utilize every weakening of European countries in East Asia with the smallest effort on her own part. Here, too, not time, but only success, will be Germany's ally.

The Dangers of the German Situation

The first danger for Germany is that in a long war other countries may

be drawn in on the enemy side for reasons arising either from economic necessity or from special interest.

The second danger is that in a long war countries which as such might be inclined to take the side of Germany might refrain from participating in our favor, fearing a lengthy war in view of the experience of the last war.

The third danger in a long war is the difficulty of assuring Germany's food with the limited food and raw material supplies available, and of obtaining the means for continuing the war. This will also have at least some affect on the morale of the people.

The greatest danger is the following:

The prerequisite for any successful warfare is to keep intact the production in the Ruhr area. Any serious loss of production in this area cannot be replaced elsewhere. Such losses would lead inevitably to the collapse of the German war economy and consequently of German defensive strength.

However, the enemy is aware of this, too.

The primary danger to the Ruhr area lies in air attacks.

Antiaircraft and fighter defenses against daylight attacks are as yet more than ample.

Defenses against night attacks are limited even now. Defense through retaliation still seems the safest method at the moment. It must be expected, however, that later in the war as soon as one of the belligerents believes that he has obtained definite superiority with a certain weapon he will utilize this superiority regardless of the expected reprisals. The longer this war lasts, the more difficult it will be to maintain German air superiority, particularly offensive air superiority.

Since Britain and France are just as aware of this weakness as we ourselves, they will attempt to accomplish this aim under all circumstances in their effort to destroy Germany. The less hope Britain and France have of beating the German Army in a succession of battles, the greater effort will they make to prepare a lengthy war of attrition and annihilation. For this purpose it is necessary to advance the Franco-British forces to the German frontier, if necessary doing away with Belgian and Dutch neutrality.

Possible Procedure

France and Britain are in no way forced to violate the Belgian and Dutch frontiers or perhaps to attack these countries themselves. Their means of pressure, as already pointed out, are so great and so compelling that they will be able at any time to cause these countries to give up their neutrality as soon as this seems advisable or necessary to the British and French governments.

To motivate such procedure to the outside world (insofar as this is believed necessary at all) it is sufficient to state that there is danger that Germany will violate the neutrality of Belgium and Holland and exploit this for propagandistic purposes in order to get these countries to declare that they are threatened and to ask for Franco-British support. Also in such a case there will first be a shift of Belgian forces from the Belgian-French border to the German-Belgian. The defense front gradually built up can be reinforced readily and quickly by

Franco-British forces, and then a possible German counterattack would be doomed to failure. Inside a few days a large number of Franco-British forces could be concentrated on the Belgian-Dutch frontier, and thus bring the war near the heart of our armament industry.

The probability, or rather the certainty, of such a decision on the part of Britain and France is supported by the undeniable fact that Germany's possession of these countries would be one of the few factors which could work to Germany's advantage in a long war.

German Possibilities in Case of a Long War

Germany's military weapons in a long war are, as far as our main enemy is concerned, the Air Force and the submarine.

Used ruthlessly, the submarine can today, also, be an extraordinary threat to Britain. The weak points in German submarine warfare consist in the long routes to the operations areas, the unusual danger to these routes, and the constant threat to the submarine bases. The fact that Britain has so far not laid the extensive mine barrage of the first World War between Norway and the Shetland Islands is due, if she is determined to fight at all, to the lack of the necessary materiel. In a long war, however, we may be sure that this sole remaining approach and departure route of our submarines will be made more difficult. Any submarine bases which it might be possible to establish outside of this narrow home base would enormously increase the possible effect of this weapon.

The Air Force

The Air Force can effectively attack the industrial center of Britain and the southern and southwestern harbors, which are of increasing importance in this war, only when it is no longer forced to attack from our present small North Sea coast via tremendous detours and over long distances. Should the Dutch-Belgian area fall into Franco-British hands, the enemy air forces would have to cover barely one sixth the distance to reach the industrial heart of Germany that German bombers need to reach really important enemy targets. If Holland, Belgium, or Pas de Calais could be used as bases for German air attacks, doubtless we could strike a vital blow at the heart of Britain in spite of reprisals.

Shortening of the approach routes is all the more important for Germany since the fuel situation is more difficult for us than for the enemy. Every thousand kilograms of fuel saved not only benefits the national economy but also means that the planes can carry one thousand kilograms more of bombs. Likewise this constitutes a saving in planes and less wear and tear on the engines, and especially saves valuable lives.

These are the very reasons why Britain and France will under all circumstances attempt to seize these areas, thus forcing us to prevent such seizure.

The German War Aim

If a real war with France and Britain should develop, it must be the German war aim to attempt to annihilate the French and British forces. The gain in territory is of importance only to the extent that it helps to destroy our enemies, and this is what counts in the long run. Therefore first of all the aim should be to destroy the enemy forces, and not until then to occupy enemy territory. Naturally there is necessarily a relationship between these two aims.

The Possibility of an Actual Clash with France and Britain

The German soldier has always been superior to the French. The historical defeats of Germany by France resulted exclusively from the fact that isolated German cities or states without help from the **Reich** had to fight the unified French state. The sole reason for all French victories was the lack of German unity. On the other hand the German people showed countless times in the last war their superior quality as soldiers.

The **achievements** of the German military leaders, too, have been greater and more evident than those of the French and the British. The German collapse which occurred nonetheless was **caused** by weaknesses which have been eliminated in our present state better than in France and Britain at the present time. Not only I myself possess this feeling of superiority, but particularly the German people and German soldier. This feeling of superiority is justified. It is based not only on the evaluation of earlier historic achievements, but also on the events of the past few years. Germany has more and better weapons and equipment for a larger number of German divisions than was the case in 1914. On the whole these weapons are newer than those of any other nation in the world. Their superlative quality has just been proved in a successful campaign. The arms of other countries must still prove themselves. In certain weapons Germany possesses undisputable superiority at the present time.

Our tanks and planes are at present unsurpassed technically by any other country not only as offensive weapons but also in their defensive capacity. Thanks to their organization and the new experienced leadership they have better operational chances than those of any other country. Armament cannot be judged by any absolute standard, but only relatively. Even today after the Polish war we have at least two to three times as many guns as at the beginning of the year 1914. The antiaircraft defenses can be considered more than amply equipped. There is no reason to believe that any other country in the world is better armed on the whole than the German Reich. France's superiority today as regards armament pertains exclusively to heavy, although old, howitzers and heavy long-range artillery, also for the most part old. These weapons cannot be decisive in any way in mobile warfare. Germany's superiority, on the other hand, lies as far as weapons are concerned in her new light and medium field artillery, in her large number of heavy infantry weapons, in her numerous antitank defenses, her new machine gun, and her excellent ammunition.

Our tanks surpassed all expectations in the Polish campaign. The Air Force is at the present time the largest in the world, and the training of the pilots is the best there is. The superiority of the German planes was shown not only in Poland, but also is making itself felt in the West. There is nothing in the world to compare with our antiaircraft artillery, the ammunition for which is, as stated already, more than ample.

If the aim of German warfare must be to destroy the offensive and defensive forces of our enemies, the best time to do so is before the British military power has developed to such an extent that France will receive reinforcements which are of great value both from a psychological and from a material standpoint. Above all, the enemy must not be permitted to overcome the weaknesses in his armament, especially as regards antitank and antiaircraft defenses, and thus reestablish a balance of power in this way..

From this standpoint every month lost works to the disadvantage of German offensive power. Likewise speed of action should not be underestimated for its psychological effect in frightening off opposition

and compelling support. Once again at the present time the German soldier is considered the best in the world. His self-esteem is as great as the respect others have for him. Half a year of irresolute warfare and effective enemy propaganda would be sufficient to weaken these important psychological imponderables.

The Polish campaign has absolutely no serious effect on our troops. None of the losses even approached the average losses at one of the offensive or defensive battles in the West. In return for the easily replaceable loss of at the most 40,000 men (of which part of the wounded will be ready for action in the near future, and the rest of which can easily be replaced) both officers and men have gained experience in warfare which could not be gained or replaced in maneuvers of any kind. Numerically the ratio between the German army now in the West and the British and French forces is more favorable than it was in 1914. As already stated, this ratio can hardly be upset by France even in the future, but it could be influenced by the gradual arrival of British forces. While I strongly object to overestimating the present French army, I just as strongly feel obliged to warn against underestimating the British forces. After a certain time they can be equipped through international industry. At the worst they have the possibility of falling back on stocks from the World War. They are especially suited for defense operations, particularly because of the British attitude. Actually, the appearance of numerous British troops will make it more difficult for the French to withdraw from the war, and will refute the effective propaganda according to which France is bearing the brunt of the attack for Britain with the lives of her soldiers.

Therefore attack, which can decide the war, is preferable under all circumstances to defense. This attack cannot begin soon enough. The coming months will not appreciably increase our striking power, but can considerably reinforce the defensive strength of our enemy.

The German Attack

The German attack is to be launched in such a way that it can lead to the annihilation of the French army, in **any case however so that it establishes** a favorable situation for continuing further successful warfare. The only section which comes into question as an offensive front under these circumstances is the sector between **Luxemburg** on the south and Nijmegen on the north, leaving out the fortress of Liege. It will be the task of the two resulting attack groups to attempt to push through the **Luxemburg**-Belgian-Dutch area in the shortest time possible, and to defeat the Belgian-French-British forces opposing the attack. An attempt should be made to pursue the attack on such broad fronts that it will be impossible for the French and British to form a continuous defensive front with the forces they have available. In principle the capture of cities or fortresses is to be considered important only insofar as they are indispensible for continuing the operations. The tank arm must be used for operations for which it is best suited. Under no circumstances must the tanks be permitted to become entangled in the endless confusion of streets in Belgian cities. Therefore it is not important for the tank forces themselves to attack a city, but it is necessary that they keep the Army moving forward, that is, by breaking through weak spots in mass attacks prevent the front from becoming static.

In view of the latest experiences of the Polish Campaign, I believe that it is inadvisable to send a tank force northward against Antwerp, as has been suggested. The task of the tank forces breaking through to the left and right of Liege will consist in relieving one another, that is, utilizing their mobility, either the southern column will

assist the northern one in crossing the canals, or the northern one will aid a breakthrough of the tank divisions possibly involved in heavy fighting south of Aix la Chapelle by attacking the rear of the enemy fortifications in that area. It seems to me more important that instead of attacking Antwerp these forces rapidly bypass this city to the west, so as to block the retreat of the Belgian army forces presumably assembling in Antwerp, and to cut the connection between the British expeditionary corps which will probably intervene there and the Belgian forces. As soon as Antwerp has been surrounded from the west, it must capitulate shortly in any case. It can be surrounded by second or third rate forces.

It is not possible to elaborate on an operations plan any further or to predict further events and the decisions and actions which will arise from them. It is possible and necessary, however, to be aware from the very start of the great task which must be aimed solely at annihilating the enemy's power. If, for reasons which cannot now be foreseen, it is impossible to do this, then the aim must be to seize an area which will provide the basis for successful warfare even for an extended period of time - if possible not only for the Air Force, but also for the submarine arm.

It is decisive for distributing our forces first of all to realize that this operation may possibly bring the war to a quick conclusion, that therefore we cannot use too many forces, and that for many of the tasks involved in this operation second and third rate forces can be used.

Second, it must be realized that in the case of large-scale enemy counterattacks the enemy must use really first class forces, and that if these are repulsed or smashed, he too will have available only second or third rate divisions. Finally, in evaluating the German forces we should keep in mind insofar as possible from the very beginning any known, probable, or even possible enemy defenses and where they are concentrated. By choice of commanders and allocation of the proper equipment during the planning of the entire operation the defeat of any such enemy counterattacks is to be assured. The nature of this campaign can force us to resort to improvisations to a very great extent, to mass more than the normal amount of offensive and defensive forces in various spots (e.g., tanks or antitank defenses), and to get along with fewer forces at other places. If necessary, large numbers of antiaircraft guns should be resorted to for defense or offense. The effect of such a concentration, particularly of the 8.8 cm. guns, will be devastating for the attacking enemy tanks, infantry, and artillery. In order to be able to carry out the operations, our area must be protected to the greatest possible extent against enemy planes by means of ground defenses as well as planes. The conditions in Poland cannot be compared to those which will exist in the West. Here it will be the task of the German Air Force, not only to annihilate or at least to eliminate the enemy air forces, but also above all to paralyze and make impossible enemy army operations.

For this purpose the targets for German ammunition should be carefully chosen. In general the enemy transportation system should not be attacked at the railway stations, but on open stretches. There low-flying planes can do a maximum of damage with a minimum of explosives.

At the same time, this purpose can be accomplished without destroying the rolling stock, which we do not wish to do. Repairs are incomparably more difficult out in the open than at the railway stations; there are no sidings, and the planes are less endangered from air defenses. Unless this can be done by other means, very fast single planes equipped with only a few 10 or 50 kg. bombs should be used for this purpose. It is more important definitely to cut a railroad line than to shoot down

an enemy plane. For attacking close columns approaching the rear which have no combat value but only supply value, 10 kg bombs can be used, since the primary aim is to break up rather than demoralize the columns. These bombs can destroy motor vehicles and injure horses, thus blocking the roads and disrupting supplies. Bombs should be used for demoralizing purposes primarily there where it is necessary to break the enemy's offensive or defensive spirit. Therefore 50 kg. bombs or heavier ones should be used mainly against battery positions, concentrations of enemy infantry, recognized bases, woods filled with soldiers, and columns headed for the front, etc. Attacks on cities should be kept at a minimum. Since it is not planned to capture fortresses or cities at any cost at once, artillery as well as bombers should be used very sparingly. The aim of all attacks must not be to destroy installations, but rather the actual living defensive or offensive strength of the enemy. Reprisal air raids in return for bombing of German cities can also be carried out at first with little equipment. All commanders should keep in mind constantly during these impending operations that the main objective is to annihilate the Franco-British army. After this goal has been achieved it will be possible for the Air Force to operate successfully against other targets. Ruthless operations by the Air Force against the heart of British resistance can and will be carried out at the proper time.

Time of the Attack

If at all possible the attack should be carried out this fall. It is therefore necessary to make every effort to prepare the tank and motorized units for action again. It should be remembered that we cannot afford to have the motor vehicles out of commission for three months after four weeks of operations in future warfare. Likewise it should take the shortest possible time to bring infantry divisions up to strength which have had as insignificant losses as was the case in Poland. The advantages of a long rest period will, in spite of training, be less than the disadvantages inherent in the troops' becoming unaccustomed to fighting. It should not take longer than 2 weeks for any division to become coordinated under its commanders and to absorb replacements.

It is particularly important to accelerate the organization of the new units as much as possible, even if that means that they are not in every respect as good as first class troops should be. When one considers the state even of first rate divisions after a lengthy battle, one will not hesitate to concede that new units, even if organized on a more moderate scale, can very well be useful and should not be condemned at once. It is important to reorganize at once the so-called fortress regiments and the Fortress Division Trier into six infantry divisions, each division possibly consisting of 2 regiments, or of 3 regiments of 2 batallions each, if it is possible after all to set up the third regiments by bringing up to strength and reorganizing the existing ones. Such expansion cannot be rejected for formal reasons, for this is the same thing as bringing up to strength an infantry division decimated in a large battle, the only difference being that in the World War such divisions had to be two thirds replaced after two weeks instead of one third, with officer losses far exceeding this proportion. The divisional artillery must if necessary be provided in a similar fashion by bringing up to strength the various Army artillery units with men and equipment from the Replacement Army, so that in this manner only a small percentage of the actual Army artillery will be used.

In order to keep the necessary materiel reserves for any emergency, the eastern army in particular should be provided rapidly with captured Czech and Polish equipment.

Preparations and assembly of forces for this attack should be camouflaged by means of techniques proved during the World War. For this purpose it is advisable to study carefully the methods used at that time and the orders issued for that purpose.

The time of the attack can be set definitely according to the number of available forces and the probable weather. The weather during the first weeks is decisive for the tank and air operations. An attack successfully begun can continue into the coldest part of the winter. The French soldiers cannot withstand the cold any better than the German. As long as the campaign does not assume the character of position warfare, the concepts of defender and attacker do not exist, and there remain only marching and fighting soldiers on both sides. Negro troops cannot be used at all during the winter. Air operations will become unimportant as soon as the enemy forces have been completely or partly smashed. Also in this respect the weather has an equal influence on both sides. The German pilot is still the better bad-weather flyer.

An offensive which is not aimed from the very beginning at annihilating the enemy forces is meaningless and will only result in the useless waste of human life. The same holds true of an attack with weak and insufficient forces. Nevertheless in case of a premature surprise attack by French forces on Belgian or Dutch territory, an effort should be made under any circumstances at least to reach a line north of Aix la Chapelle and in Holland which would assure a better defense.

Furthermore if our big offensive is halted in any way, a defense line must be built immediately in the rear, with the materials which would otherwise be used to reinforce our Westwall.

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 9 Oct. 1939

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Top secret

Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War.

1. If it should become apparent in the near future that Britain and, under her influence, France also, are unwilling to end the war, I am determined to go over to the offensive without much delay.

2. A long period of waiting will result not only in losing Belgian and perhaps also Dutch neutrality, to the advantage of the Western Powers, but also in strengthening the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree; it will shake the confidence of neutrals in a final German victory, and will discourage Italy from entering the war on our side.

3. I therefore issue the following orders for the conduct of military

operations:

a. Preparations are to be made for an offensive at the northern flank of the Western Front, through the area of Luxemburg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This attack must be carried out as soon as possible and with the strongest possible forces.

b. The purpose of this offensive is to defeat as large a portion as possible of the French field army, together with the allies fighting at her side, and at the same time to conquer as large an area as possible in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France, to serve as a base for air and sea warfare against Britain which would give promise of success, and as a wide protective belt for the vitally important Ruhr area.

c. The date of this attack depends on the operational readiness of the tank and motorized units and on weather conditions. The forces mentioned are to be made ready for action as quickly as possible.

4. The Air Force will prevent the Anglo-French air force from attacking our Army, and will, as far as is required, directly support the Army's advance. In this connection it will be important to prevent the Anglo-French air force from gaining a foothold in Belgium and Holland, as well as to prevent British troops from landing there.

5. The Navy must make every effort directly or indirectly to support the operations of the Army and Air Force during this attack.

6. Apart from preparations for beginning the attack in the West according to plan, the Army and Air Force are to be ready, at all times and in steadily growing strength, to oppose at a moment's notice and as far inland as practicable any Anglo-French entry into Belgium; likewise to occupy as great a part of Holland as possible in the direction of the west coast.

7. The true purpose of these preparations must be concealed by the pretext that they are merely precautionary measures against the threatened concentration of French and British forces on the Franco-Luxemburg and Franco-Belgian frontiers.

8. I request the respective Commanders in Chief to submit to me as soon as possible detailed reports regarding their plans based on this directive and to keep me constantly informed concerning the state of preparations through the Armed Forces High Command.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 18 Oct. 1939

OKW/WFA Nr. 181/39 Gk.Chefs. L I — No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

Directive No. 7 for the Conduct of the War

Until the planned attack against the western enemy is begun, the previous directives for warfare in the West are supplemented herewith.

1. Permission is granted effective immediately as follows:

The Army may cross the French border with patrols but only as far as this is necessary for reconnaissance and for keeping in touch with an enemy avoiding contact.

The Air Force may send fighter escorts into French territory as far as this is necessary for protecting our reconnaissance; may raid British naval forces in naval harbors (oral advance notification).

The Navy may attack enemy passenger ships which are in a convoy or are sailing without lights.

The Fuehrer will decide on all other measures suggested for the purpose of intensifying the war against British shipping, as soon as these measures have been checked by the Armed Forces High Command as to their political and economic effect.

The attacks against British naval vessels at sea and in naval harbors are to be continued at every favorable opportunity, the Navy and the Air Force cooperating closely.

2. In case a Franco-British invasion into Belgium must be repulsed (Directive No. 6, paragraph 6), the Army will be permitted to enter Luxemburg territory.

If that occurs, the Air Force will support the Army directly and will protect it from raids by British and French air forces. Our Air Force will also interfere with the approach and transport of enemy forces. A further objective is to prevent British troop landings in Belgium and Holland and to prevent British and French air forces from gaining a foothold there. For this purpose flights will be allowed over the entire western frontier of Germany. Raids on industrial targets and such raids as might endanger the civilian population to a high degree are not permitted in Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg.

For the Navy, the principles stated in Directive No. 6, paragraph 5, apply in this case, also.

3. Besides the measures taken by the commanders of the individual branches of the Armed Forces, the offices directly subordinate to the Armed Forces High Command (particularly the Inspector of the Armed Forces Signal Communications and the Intelligence and Propaganda Division) should work together to conceal our preparations for an attack.

Pertinent suggestions and requests are to be submitted as soon as pos-

sible to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Planning.

By direction
signed: Keitel
countersigned: Warlimont
Colonel, General Staff

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 9 Nov. 1939

WFA/L Ib Nr. 189/39 g.K.Chefs. — No. 1 of four copies

Top secret

Re: The planned operations of the Navy in accordance with directive No. 6

Reference: Skl A Iop Nr. 344/39 g.K. Chefs. of 7 Nov. 1939

1. The Fuehrer has issued the following orders concerning naval operations:

a. No naval operations which would warn the enemy may be carried out prior to the land operation.

b. No naval attacks against Holland must be carried out until it becomes evident that Holland is taking the side of the enemy or that the enemy is threatening or violating Dutch neutrality.

2. With this in mind the following directives are outlined for naval operations:

a. Submarines may carry out mining operations against Belgian harbors in the night prior to the attack; surface forces and planes may lay mines the moment the Army attack begins.

Also during submarine mining operations an attempt is to be made to keep the time between the minelaying and the beginning of the land attack as short as possible.

b. Mining operations against Dutch harbors and channels can be carried out only by special order. This applies also to the Westerscheldt, even though thereby the approach to Antwerp will remain open at first, and perhaps also the approach to Zeebruegge.

By direction

signed: Jodl

[redacted]

Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 14 Nov. 1939

WFA/L Nr. 213/39 g.K.Chefs. — No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has made the following decisions:

1. It is now to be expected that if German forces march through the southern tip of Holland and strong air forces (7th Airborne Division) fly over Holland, the enemy likewise will no longer observe Dutch neutrality, will fly over Dutch territory with attacking forces, and perhaps even establish a foothold in fortress Holland with some forces. It will then become necessary for the air defense of Western Germany, especially the Ruhr area and the North Sea harbors, to gain a larger buffer area for our air defenses by occupying as much of Holland as possible.

Therefore, from the beginning of the western offensive, the Army must be ready to occupy the Dutch area, to begin with ahead of fortress Holland, on orders of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. A minimum of forces is to be used for this purpose.

The Navy, in addition to the other tasks falling to it, will have to assist the Army in the occupation of the Dutch islands. The Dutch harbors and Dutch shipping channels may not be blocked before the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces so orders. The same applies to measures against the Dutch fleet.

The extent of Air Force operations in the Dutch area will depend on the situation. Villages and especially the large open cities are to be spared, unless there are urgent military reasons for not doing so. Preparations are to be made for advancing air defense forces into the Dutch area. Beginning on A day, attacks on troop transports from Britain or France in the ports of embarkation and debarkation as well as at sea will be permitted.

2. Effective at once, the Navy will be permitted to sink without warning enemy passenger steamers which are recognized to be armed and the armament of which is known.

The names of passenger steamers which are already known to be armed should appear constantly in the press.

Tankers sailing from France to England or England to France can be sunk without warning in an area off the coasts of England and France specified by the Commander in Chief, Navy. Tankers definitely recognized as American, Russian, Japanese, Italian, or Spanish are exeepted.

signed: Keitel

[redacted]

Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 15 Nov. 1939

W.F.A. Nr. 20/39 Gkdos. Chefs. — No. 2 of seven copies

Subject: Operation "Gelb"

Top secret

The inquiries of the Army High Command with reference to the execution of directive OKW/WFA/L Nr. 213/39 Gk. Chefs. of 14 Nov. 1939 were discussed today with the Fuehrer.

The result was as follows:

The security of the Ruhr region, to be achieved by advancing the air reconnaissance organization and air defense as far as possible into Dutch territory, is of no small importance for the general strategy of the war.

The more Dutch territory we occupy the more effective the defense of the Ruhr area can be made. This point of view must determine the Army's objectives, even if the Army and Navy are not directly interested in gaining such territory. Therefore the preparations of the Army must be made in such a manner that, on special orders, Dutch territory can be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line, to begin with. Whether this objective can and need be advanced any farther will then depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch, as well as on the effectiveness of their inundations.

Preparatory measures should also be taken to occupy, with the assistance of the Navy, the West Frisian islands except Texel for the time being, as soon as the northern coast of Groningen is in our hands; they, too, are of great importance as bases for the plane reporting service, and we must make sure that Britain cannot use them for similar purposes.

signed: Keitel

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 20 Nov. 1939

OKW/WFA Nr. 213/39 g.K.Chefs.Abt.L(I) — No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

Directive No. 8 for the Conduct of the War

1. For the time being we must be ready to continue at any time the strategic assembly of forces which has already begun. Only if we do this will it be possible to take advantage immediately of favorable

weather conditions.

The branches of the Armed Forces will make their preparations in such a way that the attack can still be cancelled, even if the order to that effect does not arrive at the High Commands until 2300 on the day before the attack is to come off. At that time, at the latest, the High Commands will receive either the code word

"Rhein" (go through with the attack)

or

"Elbe" (stop the attack).

(The words "Rhein" and "Elbe" were changed to "Danzig" and "Augsburg", a marginal note reading: Corrected as per 1/Skl I Op 42/40 I a).

The Commanders in Chief, Army and Air are requested to report to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Planning, immediately after the day of attack has been determined, the hour of attack agreed upon between them.

2. Contrary to instructions contained in the earlier directive, all the proposed measures against Holland may be taken without special orders when the general attack begins.

The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be predicted. Where no resistance is met, the invasion is to be given the character of a peaceful occupation.

3. Land operations are to be executed on the basis of the directive concerning strategic deployment of forces of 29 Oct.

That directive is supplemented as follows:

a. All possible preparations should be made to facilitate a quick shift of the focal point of the operation from Army Group B to Army Group A, in case greater and quicker successes are scored there than at Army Group B, which seems likely with the present distribution of enemy forces.

b. Holland, including the West Frisian islands off the coast (excluding Texel for the present), is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line, for the time being.

4. The Navy's submarines will be allowed to take blockading measures against Belgian and, contrary to previous directives, also against Dutch harbors and shipping lanes during the night before the attack; its surface vessels and airplanes will be allowed to take such measures after the time the Army's attack begins. Even where the submarines are concerned, however, the space of time between the beginning of blockading operations and the time of the land attack must be kept as short as possible.

Operations against Dutch naval forces are permitted only if the latter take a hostile attitude.

At the coastal areas to be occupied, the Navy will be in charge of the coastal artillery defense against attacks from the sea. Preparations should be made for this.

5. The duties of the Air Force remain unchanged. They have been

supplemented by the special verbal orders issued by the Fuehrer concerning airborne landings and the support to be given to the Army during the capture of the bridges west of Maastricht.

The 7th Airborne Division will be used for air landing operations only after the bridges across the Albert Canal are in our hands. The message to this effect is to be assured the quickest possible transmission between the High Command, Army and the High Command, Air Force.

Population centers, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked either in the Dutch or in the Belgian-**Luxemburg** area without compelling military reasons.

6. Closing the border:

a. We will have to permit traffic and news to cross the Dutch, Belgian, and **Luxemburg** borders in the customary manner until the beginning of the attack, in order to preserve the element of surprise. Civil authorities are not to be involved in the preparations for closing the border until that time.

b. When the attack begins the German border adjacent to Holland, Belgium, and **Luxemburg** is to be closed to all non-military traffic and news. Orders to that effect will be given by the Commander in Chief, Army to the military and civilian offices concerned. At the beginning of the attack, the Armed Forces High Command will inform the highest government authorities that measures to close the border are being ordered directly by the Commander in Chief, Army, even at those parts of the Dutch border which are outside of the area of operations.

c. At the other (neutral) borders no restrictions will be made for the time being concerning the crossing of news and traffic. Further measures prepared with regard to the supervision of the crossing of persons and news will be put into effect if the need arises.

By direction,

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 29 Nov. 1939

OKW/WFA Nr. 215/39 g.Kdos. Chefs. Abt.L I — No. 2 of eleven copies

Top secret

Directive No. 9

Principles for the Conduct of the War against the Enemy's Economy.

1. In the war against the Western Powers, Great Britain is the driving spirit and the leading power of our enemies. The conquest of Britain is, therefore, the prerequisite for final victory.

The most effective means to achieve this is to paralyze Britain's economy through interrupting it at critical points.

2. The development of the situation and progress in our armament may, in the near future, create favorable conditions for extensive warfare against the foundations of British economy. The necessary provisions must therefore be made as early as possible for striking a destructive blow at the British economy by concentrating suitable weapons of our Armed Forces on the most important targets.

The non-military means of warfare, complementary to the measures of the Armed Forces, will be put into effect according to special instructions.

3. As soon as the Army has succeeded in defeating the Anglo-French field army and in occupying and holding a part of the coast facing England, the task of the Navy and the Air Force of carrying on warfare against the economic structure of Britain will become of prime importance. Cooperation of the sabotage and fifth column organizations is desirable.

4. To the Navy and Air Force will fall the following joint tasks, enumerated here in the sequence of their importance:

a. Attacks on the main British ports of transshipment by mining and blocking the approaches to the harbors and by destroying vital port installations and sea locks.

In this connection the role of the mine-laying planes will be a very important one, especially with regard to the harbors on the west coast of Britain, in narrow waterways, and estuaries.

b. Attacks on British merchant shipping and against the enemy fleet protecting it.

c. Destruction of British supplies of oil and of food in cooling plants and grain elevators.

d. Interference with British troop and supply transports to the French coast.

e. Destruction of industrial plants, the elimination of which is of decisive importance for the conduct of the war; above all of key-plants of the aviation industry and the factories producing heavy ordnance, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition, and explosives.

5. The most important transshipment ports in the British Isles, which handle 95% of the foreign trade and could not be adequately replaced by others, are:

London
Liverpool
Manchester
} for imports of food, timber, and oil, and the processing thereof.

These three harbors, handling 58% of England's peacetime imports, are of decisive importance.

Newcastle
Blyth
Sunderland
Hull
Swansea
Cardiff
Barry
} for the export of coal.

The following may be considered alternate harbors, but to a limited extent and for certain goods only:

Grangemouth	Holyhead
Leith	Bristol
Middlesbrough	Belfast
Grimsby	Newport
Southampton	Goole
Glasgow	Dundee

It will be necessary to watch continuously for any possible shifting in the use of these harbors. Besides it will be important gradually to compress and shift British foreign trade into channels which are within easy range of our naval and air forces.

French harbors will be attacked only insofar as they play a role in the siege of Britain, or if they are of importance as debarkation points for troops.

6. In harbors which cannot be blocked effectively with mines, merchant shipping is to be paralyzed by sinking ships in the roadsteads and by destroying vital harbor installations. Special emphasis is to be laid upon the destruction of the great canal locks at the harbors of Leith, Sunderland, Hull, Grimsby, London, Manchester (Ship Canal), Liverpool, Cardiff, Swansea, and Bristol-Avonmouth. Particularly on the west coast these locks are very important in regulating the water level and, through it, the harbor traffic.

7. In preparing these actions it will be important to do the following:

a. Continually to check and supplement the basic data available on British harbors, their installations and capacity, as well as information of the British war industries and supply depots.

b. To rush the development of an effective method enabling planes to lay moored mines also.

c. To provide a large supply of mines, sufficient for the increased demands of the Navy and Air Force.

d. To coordinate the strategy of the Navy and Air Force, as to time and location.

These preparations are to be made as soon as possible. I request the Commanders in Chief of the Navy and the Air Force to keep me constantly informed about their plans.

I shall decide later as to when the restrictions still in effect in the naval and air war will be lifted. This probably will coincide with the start of the big offensive.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 11 Dec. 1939

Nr. 22231/39 g.Kdos.Chefs.Abt.L (Ib) — No. 2 of eight copies

Top secret

Re: Supplement to Directive No. 8

The Fuehrer ordered the following change in paragraph 4, section 1 of directive no. 8:

The surface forces also, in addition to the submarines, will be permitted to lay mines at the Belgian and Dutch harbors in the night before the attack. However, care must be taken that these countries do not receive previous warning, and thus the surprise element of the land operations is jeopardized. For this reason, as in the case of the submarines, the time between the start of the mining operations and the beginning of the land attack should be as short as possible.

If however, it is evident that because of unfavorable conditions, e.g., moonlit night, mining operations cannot be carried out undetected, mining operations of surface forces should be dispensed with.

The provision that mining operations can be maintained until 2300 of the night preceding the attack remains in effect.

The provision that airplane operations cannot begin before the land attack also remains unchanged.

signed: Keitel

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 13 Dec. 1939

WFA Nr. 23/39 g.K.Chefs. — No. 2 of nine copies

Top secret

Re: Operation "Gelb"

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has ordered:

1. Should British troops, as indicated by foreign reports, be used in the Maginot line, and appear in front of our Westwall, the first occasion should be used to inflict a considerable blow which would serve to impair seriously the morale of these unseasoned troops and to lower their prestige in the eyes of their allies (on 12 Dec. telephoned ahead).

2. Preparations for using the 7th Airborne Division (including part

or all of the 22nd Division) are to be made in such a way that the division can be used according to the situation as follows:

a. Ahead of the front of the 6th Army (Bridgehead G).

b. Ahead of the 4th Army (Meuse crossings between Namur and Dinant, in accordance with directive OKW/WFA (L) Nr. 221/39 g.K. Chefs. of 28 Nov. 1939, paragraph 2 b).

Even though an effort is being made to reach a decision on A minus 1 day at the latest concerning the use of the 7th Airborne Division according to 2 a or 2 b, which the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has reserved for himself, it may however not be possible to reach it until A day itself.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

Supplement to Directive 8

Naval Staff War Diary

Naval Staff, Operations Division

Part A, Vol. 4 13 Dec. 1939

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff Special Items:

1. The Fuehrer has postponed operation "Gelb". The code word was sent at 0303.

2. The attack on Holland is permitted for surface forces as well as for submarines. However, everything possible must be done to keep the enemy from being forewarned; if weather conditions should be unfavorable (e.g., a bright, moonlit night) surface forces will cancel their mission. The stipulation will remain in force that it must be possible to halt the operation as late as the night before it is to take place.

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 28 Dec. 1939

WFA Nr. 22245/39 g.Kdos.Chefs. — No. 2 of nine copies

Top secret

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander made the following decisions during the past few days:

1. The Spichern heights are to be included in the fortifications of the Westwall, to be held against any attacks, to be fortified accordingly, and to be connected at the sides with the Westwall.

2. Weather predictions indicate a period of clear, cold winter weather, also in western Europe, after snowfalls in the middle of January. If this is the case, this time will be utilized for the offensive in the west.

With this in mind, the equipment of the troops is to be examined once more, to see whether they have everything necessary for a winter campaign, and everything needed should be supplied.

3. In clear winter weather, especially if the ground is covered with snow, it may be possible to carry out the surprise attacks planned by the Air Force at night, and thus to change the time of the attack to the night.

This order would conform with the desires of the Army, and make a decision concerning the use of the 7th Airborne Division at dawn easier, but would make it more difficult to attack the enemy air force at its air fields by surprise.

The Commanders in Chief of the Army and the Air Force are requested to express their opinions on the following:

a. Is it possible, or at least desirable, to begin the attack at night?

b. How should the time of attack be chosen with reference to moonrise and sunrise on 14 Jan.?

4. The over-all operation, at the beginning, will not concentrate on any one point. Depending on the initial successes, emphasis will be placed at either of the two army groups or at the inner wings of the two groups. Strong Army reserves will make it possible to reinforce the armies used at the beginning, or to form new armies.

The Commander in Chief, Army has made preparations to carry out these measures quickly.

Success or failure of the surprise attacks at the 6th Army during the first hours of the first day of the attack cannot definitely determine where the emphasis should be placed. For this purpose an exact survey of the situation at the entire front of Army Groups A and B will be necessary, as it develops as the result of the first battles and enemy countermeasures.

In order to coordinate the operations of the Army and the Air Force, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander himself is reserving not only how the 7th Airborne Division should be used, but also where the main emphasis

of the entire operation should be placed.

Therefore neither the Army nor the Air Force should take steps without orders or approval of the Fuehrer, which would interfere with the Fuehrer's decision as to where the main emphasis should be placed.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

signed: Keitel

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 30 Dec. 1939

WFA Nr. 22249/39 g.K.Chefs.Abt.L I — No. 1 of eleven copies

Top secret

Re: Merchant warfare against Britain by means of submarines

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces made the following decision on 30 Dec. 1939, after a conference with Commander in Chief, Navy:

1. Greek merchant vessels are to be treated as enemy vessels in the blockade area declared by the U.S. and Britain.

2. In the Bristol Channel attacks are permissible without warning against any ships; they are to be made to appear like mine hits.

3. Both measures are to become effective at once.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

By direction

signed: Jodl

[redacted]

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 30 Dec. 1939

Nr. (illegible)/39 g.Kdos.Chefs.WFA/Abt.L I — No. 2 of copies

Top secret

Re: Intensified measures for naval and aerial warfare in connection with operation "Gelb".

In addition to the orders issued already in direct connection with operation "Gelb" for the Navy and the Air Force, the following intensified measures for naval and aerial warfare become effective at the beginning of the west operations:

1. The Navy is authorized to attack without warning all ships in the areas off the enemy coasts by means of submarines, where sinkings by mines are feasible. The sinkings are to be made to appear as the results of mine hits. The submarines must keep this in mind in their behavior and use of arms.

The Commander in Chief, Navy will determine these areas in detail, and report them to the Armed Forces High Command.

2. The Air Force will have the following tasks during operations in the West:

a. To support these operations directly. (Directive No. 6, paragraph 4.)

In addition to the operations area itself, it will be important to attack troop transports from the British Isles to Belgium, France, and Holland, including the ports of embarkation and debarkation, as well as the ground installations of the R.A.F. in the mother country from where operations can be launched against the Continent.

b. To tie up as many fighter forces as possible in the British Isles.

It is not intended through our own initiative to start large-scale aerial warfare until we have established favorable bases, and strong forces are available for the war against the British Isles.

For this reason attacks endangering the civilian population will be reserved only for such cases where reprisals are in order.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

Note: Cancelled by OKW Nr. 22010/40 WFA/L.

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 11 Jan. 1940

Basic Order

1. No one, no office or officer, may learn of a secret matter unless this is absolutely necessary in the line of duty.

2. No office or officer may learn more about a secret matter than is absolutely necessary for carrying out the task in question.

3. No office or officer may learn about a secret matter or the necessary part of a secret matter earlier than is absolutely necessary for carrying out the task in question.

4. It is forbidden thoughtlessly to pass on orders, the secrecy of which is of decisive importance, according to some general distribution list.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 17 Jan. 1940

OKW/WFA Abt. L II Nr. 22 005/40 g.K.Chefs. — No. 2 of six copies

Top secret

1. The increasing strength of the enemy's armed forces, especially that of the British Army, makes it imperative to reinforce the German Armed Forces also, by utilizing every possible means. Especially the Army and Air Force must be improved numerically and in equipment and striking power.

All the necessary organizational measures, especially those pertaining to the establishment of new units, are to be initiated without delay. The required orders are to be issued without stating the reasons behind them and formulated so as not to give any insight into our operational plans.

Every possible effort is to be exerted in getting the new units ready for action at the earliest possible time.

2. I charge the respective Commanders in Chief with the following responsibilities in the field of organization:

a. Army:

Over and above the new units already in the process of

organization, ten additional combat divisions are to be formed.

In order to assure sound composition from the standpoint of personnel, complete units (battalions, batteries, etc.) from the frontline divisions of the 1st, 2nd, and 4th waves are to be used as the cadres of these new divisions.

The Navy and Air Force are to assist in forming these new divisions by supplying young, well-trained personnel (commissioned and noncommissioned officers and enlisted men) from coastal defense, antiaircraft artillery and Air Force signal service, if the Army requires such assistance from the other branches of the Armed Forces.

Insofar as possible the new divisions are to be equipped with new, modern arms.

Furthermore, additional medium artillery units are to be formed in the manner already begun, drawing upon front-line troops for cadres to as large an extent as possible, so that every available artillery piece not required by the replacement army will be utilized at the front.

b. Air Force:

The re-equipment of existing air units and the establishment of new ones, scheduled for spring 1940, is to be expedited. My decree of 6 March 1939, regarding the transfer of personnel from Army, Navy, and SS units (Verfuegungstruppen) to the Air Force for new units or as replacements remains in full effect.

Every effort is to be made to fit bombers for carrying mines and to step up the mine production program. Transport gliders and transport planes are to be turned out in the greatest possible numbers.

3. Urgently needed skilled workers, for whom deferment requests with priority certificates have already been made out, are immediately to be made available to the armament factories in order to raise the output of the war industries, even if this causes a temporary weakening of the Armed Forces. However, steps must be taken to assure that the gaps so created will be filled within a short time and that indispensable experts will not be withdrawn from the ranks of the Armed Forces.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 23 Jan. 1940

WFA Nr. 22038/40 g.K.Chefs.Abt.L(Ib) — No. 1 of four copies

Top secret

Re: Operation "Gelb"

1. The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the Army and the Air Force to make preparations for operation "Gelb" in a new manner which will be known only to very few persons to be reported by name to the Fuehrer.

The troops and all commanders except the above are to be informed only that the emergency case (see paragraph 2) has grown more probable in view of the political situation, and that therefore stronger forces must be held in readiness.

2. The Army and the Air Force are therefore to prepare for 2 possibilities:

a. To strike at once if French and British forces enter Belgium or British forces occupy Holland (emergency case).

b. To attack following a code word issued if possible only the day before the attack, if information is available which would justify such a decision from a political point of view (G case).

3. The Fuehrer has ordered for both cases that such strong forces of the Army and Air Force be used against Holland that in a very short time the entire Dutch area, inclusive of the islands, is in our hands.

The Commander in Chief, Army will therefore put an army in charge of execution of this operation.

4. The Navy will prepare the measures previously decided upon with the available forces to the extent possible between the time the order is given and the time of the attack.

The mine operations are to be concentrated in the Scheldt estuary. The next important area for mining is Texelstrom-Den Helder.

Attacks on Dutch naval forces can be made as soon as the Army attacks.

This cancels paragraph 4 of the second section of Directive No. 8 (OKW/WFA Nr. 213/39 g.K.Chefs.Abt.L(I) of 20 Nov. 1939).

signed: Keitel

[redacted]

Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 2 Feb. 1940

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 22 048/40 g.K.Chefs. — No. 2 of nine copies

Top secret

Directives for enemy deception

In order to coordinate all measures for deception in questions pertaining to the Armed Forces and thus make them more effective, the following directives should be adhered to:

1. The Operations Planning Branch, Operations Division, Armed Forces High Command is in charge of unified direction. This office processes the directives approved by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander and adjusts them to the situation.

They are to be carried out by the branches of the Armed Forces (command measures) and the Armed Forces Intelligence Division (intelligence service), which maintain close contact with the Operations Planning Branch, Operations Division, Armed Forces High Command for this purpose. In matters of radio deception the branches of the Armed Forces are to call on the Chief, Armed Forces Communications.

2. The personnel which is familiar with the circumstances of such deception in their entirety must be kept as small as possible. In questions which reveal our intentions regarding deception, the Armed Forces High Command will deal only with the operations divisions of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. In each one of these one person is to be named for this purpose.

3. Measures for deception:

Branches of the Armed Forces: Command measures which are suitable for deceiving the enemy are to be made watertight against the enemy intelligence service, and should bear out the rumors spread by our own intelligence. It is necessary for any large-scale deception that our own troops and to a great extent also the command authorities believe in the authenticity of the measures, and do not know about the intention to deceive.

Armed Forces High Command (Intelligence Division):

Counterespionage.

Spreading of rumors by travellers abroad (e.g.: travelling on business).

Careful information to neutral military and naval attaches.

Own military and naval attaches.

Systematic exploitation of "salon espionage".

Exchange of intelligence with neutral states.

Etc.

4. Directives for deception on the Western Front and in other areas in accordance with the present situation are set forth in annexes 1, 2, 3, and 4. All personnel involved should strive to improve deceptive

methods by means of new ideas and suggestions.

Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

Annex 1: Western Front (not included)
Annex 2: Scandinavia and Britain
Annex 3: Balkans
Annex 4: Russia

Annex 2

Measures for Deception in Scandinavia and Britain

Purpose:

Camouflage of preparations for operation "Weseruebung".

Execution:

All preparations for operation "Weseruebung" are to be explained to our troops and as far as possible also to the command authorities as preparations for an invasion of England.

(Handwritten marginal note added at the Naval Staff: "Which the level-headed expert will recognize as deception under the given circumstances."

Annex 3

Measures for Deception in the Balkans

Purpose:

To emphasize the strong German position in the Balkans.

Execution:

Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division:

The following idea is to be spread: Germany is prepared for the fact that the enemy wants to establish a Balkan front from European Turkey or Greece, and is prepared to launch a blitz operation with superior forces against such an attempt at the very start. This would of course temporarily interfere with German supplies from Rumania, but in the long run would strengthen Germany's position, especially since Italian interests are not to be affected.

The necessary forces for such an operation are available and are not being employed in the West. Nevertheless the growth of Weygand's army in Syria is being followed with concern.

Army and Air Force:

The Army and Air Force will use newly-set-up units, occupy training

areas, etc., in the southeastern part of Germany, in order to confirm rumors spread by the Intelligence Service. (Cooperation with the Armed Forces Intelligence Division.)

Annex 4

Relations with Russia

Purpose:

To keep the enemy uncertain about our military relations with Russia.

Execution (Intelligence Service):

Our military connections with Russia are closer than apparent on the outside. Although Russia was not successful in Finland in the beginning, the strength of the Russian Armed Forces is not underestimated. The Russian position in the area between the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf is considered especially strong.

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 5 Feb. 1940

22044/40 g.K.Chefs.Abt.L I (2 Ang.) — No. 2 of five copies

Top secret

Re: OKW WFA/Abt. I Nr. 22044/40 g.K. Chefs. of 25 Jan. 1940

At the request of the Air Force, Annex 3 of the above-mentioned directive is changed as follows:

1. The following paragraphs are to be cancelled: I A 3, I B 2, and I B 3.

2. A new paragraph I B is to be inserted:

B. Against sea targets:

1. Air attacks without warning are permitted against single neutral ships and against unarmed enemy passenger steamers which are not carrying troops, with the following exceptions:

In the sea area between the British east coast and the British declared mine area, air attacks without warning are permitted against any ships except against Italian, Japanese, and Danish merchant ships with a Maltese cross, and against single neutral passenger steamers and single unarmed enemy passenger steamers recognized as not carrying troops.

2. At night in the American declared area west of 20° E, air attacks without warning are permissible against any ship proceeding without lights.

3. A new paragraph II B is to be inserted:

B. Against sea targets:

Air attacks without warning as in paragraph I B.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Berlin, 26 Feb. 1940

OKW/WFA Nr. 39/40 g.Kdos. — No. 2 of five copies

Secret

In the past months of the war the Armed Forces have repeatedly suffered considerable losses through our own action.

I am aware of the fact that frictions and misunderstandings can never be completely eliminated in wartime.

I must insist all the more that everything humanly possible be done to prevent mistaking our own troops or troop units for those of the enemy.

For this the following is essential:

1. Command posts of all ranks must inform each other beyond any possibility of misunderstanding concerning movements taking place on land, at sea, and in the air within one and the same area of operations.

2. All troops of the Army in advance of a certain line agreed upon from time to time between the Army and the Air Force must be marked, preferably with swastika flags, in a manner excluding all possibility of mistakes from the air.

The contradictory requirements of camouflage with respect to the enemy on one side, and identification with respect to our own Air Force on

the other, necessitate particular consideration and agreement.

3. Strieter orders are to be given concerning identification signals in all situations which could lead to mistaking a friend for a foe.

I request the Commanders in Chief to take great care that the required orders are issued at the earliest possible time, and that the troops recognize the necessity for these orders more generally than has been the case in the past.

The confidence of every branch of the Armed Forces in mutual aid and protection is not only a material but also a psychological prerequisite for success.

I cannot tolerate the loss of this confidence on the battlefield or at sea on account of careless handling of the principles of cooperation between the components of the Armed Forces, with the result that, instead of giving mutual assistance, we shall incur further grave losses.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 22070/40 G.Kdos.Chefs.

Berlin, 1 Mar. 1940

No. 3 of nine copies

Top secret

Directive for Operation "Weseruebung"

1. The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires that all preparations be made to occupy Denmark and Norway with parts of the Armed Forces (operation "Weseruebung"). This measure should prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea, safeguard our ore resources in Sweden, and expand the bases of the Navy and the Air Force for attacks on the British Isles.

Insofar as possible, the Navy and the Air Force have the task of protecting the operation against interference from British naval and air forces.

In view of our military and political strength in relation to the Nordic states, the forces to be used for operation "Weseruebung" should be kept as small as possible. The small numbers must be compensated for by bold action and surprise.

Basically an effort is to be made to give the operation the character of a peaceful occupation designed to give armed protection to the neutrality of the Nordic states. Demands to this effect will be presented to the governments concerned at the beginning of the occupation. If

necessary, demonstrations by naval and air forces will lend the required emphasis. If in spite of this there should be resistance, it is to be broken with all military means.

2. I order General von Falkenhorst (Infantry), Commanding General of the XXI Army Corps (Commander of Group XXI), to make preparations and command the operation against Denmark and Norway.

This commander is directly subordinate to me in command matters. Members of all three branches of the Armed Forces are to make up his staff.

The forces for operation "Weseruebung" will be under a special command, and will not be available for other theaters.

The air forces used for operation "Weseruebung" will be under the tactical command of Group XXI. After they have fulfilled their task they will revert to the Commander in Chief, Air.

Naval and air forces directly commanded by the Navy and Air Force are to operate in close cooperation with the Commander of Group XXI.

The branches of the Armed Forces are to provide supplies for the forces assigned to Group XXI, according to the requests of the Commander.

3. The border to Denmark should be crossed at the same time that the landing in Norway occurs. Preparations for the operations should be expedited as much as possible. In case the enemy should take the initiative against Norway, we must take countermeasures at once.

The most important thing is for our operations to take the Nordic countries as well as the western enemies by surprise. This should be kept in mind in making all preparations, especially in assembling the troops and the shipping space, training, and loading. If the preparations for embarking can no longer be kept secret, the commanders and troops should be given a false destination. The troops must not become aware of the real objective until they have put to sea.

4. Occupation of Denmark ("Weseruebung Sued")

Task of Group XXI: A surprise occupation of Jutland and Fuenen, and subsequent occupation of Zealand.

For this purpose our forces should advance as quickly as possible as far as Skagen and the east coast of Fuenen, safeguarding the most important points. In Zealand bases should be seized early in the operation as points of departure for the later occupation.

The Navy will make forces available for protecting the connection Nyborg-Korsoer, for occupying quickly the Little Belt bridge, and if necessary also for troop landings. It will also prepare the coastal defenses.

The Air Force will provide air units primarily for demonstration purposes and for dropping leaflets. It should assure exploitation of the Danish ground organizati[illegible], and should provide for air defenses.

5. Occupation of Norway ("Weseruebung Nord")

Task of Group XXI: Surprise occupation of the important coastal points from the sea and air.

The Navy will take care of preparing and executing the sea transport of the invasion troops and of the troops subsequently to be transported to

Oslo. It will safeguard supplies shipped there by sea. Coastal defenses in Norway are to be prepared quickly.

The Air Force, following the occupation, should ensure adequate air defense as well as exploitation of Norway as a base for aerial warfare against Britain.

6. Group XXI will keep the Armed Forces High Command informed of the state of the preparations, and will submit a time schedule. It is to specify the minimum time which must elapse between issuance of the order to carry out operation "Weseruebung" and the operation itself.

The intended headquarters should be reported.

Cover names: "Wesertag" - day of the operation

"Weserzeit" - hour of the operation

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 4 Mar. 1940

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 22075/40 g.K.Chefs. — No. 3 of nine copies

Top secret

Re: Operation "Weseruebung"

1. The directive of the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces WFA/Abt. L Nr. 22070/40 g.K.Chefs. of 1 Mar. 1940 is to be changed on page 2 as follows:

Delete: The 3rd, 4th, and 5th paragraphs of section 2 ("The forces for operation "Weseruebung" ..... with the Commander of Group XXI.")

Insert instead: "The forces for operation "Weseruebung" will be under a special command. The naval forces of the Navy and the forces of the Air Force remain under the Commanders in Chief, Navy and Air. They are to be committed in close cooperation with the Commander of Group XXI. The 1st Reconnaissance Squadron (F) and the two motorized anti-aircraft detachments of the Air Force will be expected from this ruling and will be directly subordinate to Group XXI until Denmark has been occupied."

2. (Translator's note: This paragraph is a correction of an order not included in this collection.)

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

[redacted]

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 14 Mar. 1940

No. 3 of nine copies

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 22094/40 g.Kdos.Chefs.

Top secret

At the outset operation "Weseruebung Nord" falls into a number of independent operations. The Army, Navy, and Air Force are involved in each one. The great distances between the various forces, the limited possibilities for communications, and the uncertainty of the military tasks confronting the various forces make it impossible to conduct the operation according to the regular principles of cooperation between the three branches of the Armed Forces. During the first days each of the combat groups must be under strict single command, and this command alone will make the decisions as to what should be done under the given circumstances.

Therefore I give the following orders to clarify these command questions:

1. During transport by sea the command is in the hands of the Navy. Any important changes pertaining to the ports of departure which become necessary as the result of the naval situation are to be ordered by Naval Group West in agreement with Group XXI.

Aboard groups of naval vessels or single ships command is in the hands of the naval commander, without regard for rank or seniority.

2. In air transport operations command is in the hands of the Air Force, or the X Air Corps, until the landing has been accomplished. Any important changes which may become necessary in the operational plans as the result of the air situation or for other reasons are to be ordered by the X Air Corps in agreement with Group XXI.

Aboard the planes command is in the hands of the commander of the air transport group or of the plane.

3. During occupation of fortifications and land operations, command will be in the hands of the senior Army commander. This officer can request support from naval and air forces. These requests must be met, unless the situation at sea or in the air, or navigational and aeronautical reasons make it impossible.

4. At the various points along the coast the senior officer or an officer designated by Group XXI will be the local armed forces commander and the representative of the German Armed Forces; in Oslo this officer will be the commander of Group XXI. In emergencies these local commanders have the right to issue orders to all forces of the three branches in their area, and these are binding also insofar as technically possible for forces otherwise under the Commanders in Chief, Navy and Air.

Otherwise the following obtains:

The commander of the Army troops has charge of land defense and land operations.

The port commander has charge of defense toward the sea.

The air force commander has charge of air defenses.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 2 Apr. 1940

No. 3 of ten copies

OKW/WFA Abt. L Nr. 22128/40 g.K.Chef.

Top secret

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered execution of operation "Weseruebung" and has called attention to the special importance of keeping the measures secret.

"Wesertag" (day of operation) - 9 April 1940

"Weserzeit" (hour of operation) - 0515

By direction

signed: Keitel

The Armed Forces High Command

Berlin, 11 Apr. 1940

WFA Nr. 75/40 g.K.

No. 1 of seven copies

Secret

Re: Operation "Weseruebung"

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered:

1. The most important task of the Navy and the Air Force during the coming days is to strengthen the Skagerrak defenses against enemy submarines with all available means.

2. In support of the Narvik Group the following forces should be used:

By the Air Force: Long-distance bombers for attacking British cruisers and destroyers lying in the western entrance to Narvik, and the Tromsoe radio station.

By the Navy: Long-distance reconnaissance planes (Do 26) to bring up ammunition and medical supplies.

3. Temporarily Air Group 606 of the Commander, Naval Air will be assigned to the X Air Corps for reconnaissance in the Skagerrak and the Kattegat.

4. Submarines are being used by the Navy for transports to Narvik.

5. It may be expected that it will be possible to supply the Narvik Group in the next few days from Trelleborg on Swedish railroads. Corresponding preparations should be made at once. Group Dietl will protect the ore railroad from Narvik to the Swedish frontier.

6. It is of the greatest political and military importance to capture the Norwegian government, with which the British envoy is said to be.

7. Group XXI will make preparations to transport parts of the 181st Division by air to Oslo while the uncertainty in the Kattegat still prevails. In addition, troops can be shipped from Skagen to Oslo on light naval forces. A number of guns with limbers and ammunition are to be transferred to Oslo on fishing trawlers and similar small vessels.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 14 Apr. 1940

WFA Nr. 88/40 g.K. — No. 2 of six copies

Secret

1. British naval forces have penetrated into Narvik; no landing has so far been reported.

According to air reconnaissance reports, British forces have landed at Andalsnes. It must be expected that landings have taken place in Namsos Fjord.

2. The most important task is to protect the Trondheim base and to smash the troops landed at Andalsnes.

3. For this purpose, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered:

a. Group XXI is to rush reinforcements by air to Trondheim and to destroy the railroad line Dombaas-Andalsnes as far west as possible.

b. The Navy should concentrate submarine defenses in the area outside and at both sides of Trondheim from Aalesund to Vikna Island, consciously diminishing thereby the reinforcements heretofore set aside for Narvik.

c. The Air Force must annihilate the British troops landed at Andalsnes, prevent additional landings, and attack the enemy naval forces north of Aalesund. Dombaas should be captured and held by all available paratroops. Trondheim should be reinforced by air with all possible means.

4. Group XXI must employ all means in order to seize and hold the railroad Oslo-Hamar-Dombaas primarily as far as Andalsnes, and then also as far as Trondheim so as to send troop reinforcements to Andalsnes and Trondheim.

5. The 181st Infantry Division is to be brought up with greatest speed, as well as the mobile troops being made available by Group XXXI.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 18 Apr. 1940

WFA Nr. 102/40 g.K. — No. 1 of six copies

Secret

Re: Norway

The Fuehrer has ordered:

1. The Narvik Group is to defend itself along the ore railroad, to tie up the enemy forces, and prepare thorough destruction of the ore railroad. It will receive ammunition and supplies. No new forces will be brought up.

2. Trondheim is of decisive importance as naval and air base. In addition to preventing landings, the garrison is to protect the railroad in the north to the Swedish border and to open the connection to the south. For this purpose the group cannot be made too strong.

3. The Commander in Chief, Air will make every possible effort to transport additional forces to Norway by air.

4. The Commander in Chief, Navy must bring up by sea the necessary heavy weapons and ammunition in agreement with Group XXI, in spite of any losses that may be incurred.

5. The most severe measures according to martial law should be taken against passive resistance of the population, refusal to work, and flight of men able to fight. The base commanders should be given the necessary powers.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

signed: Keitel

[redacted]

The Armed Forces High Command — Berlin, 1 May 1940

WFA/Abt. L Nr 22168/40 Gkdos.Chefs. — No. 3 of five copies

Top secret

Re: Operation "Gelb"

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has ordered:

The High Commands will make all preparations for operation "Gelb" in such a way that beginning at 1200 on Saturday, 4 May, A day may be set any time for the next day.

This notice is meant only for the command staffs of the high commands. It is forbidden to pass on this information to subordinate commands or to offices not involved.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command

By direction

signed: Jodl

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces — Headquarters, 14 May 1940

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 33 002/40 g.K.Chefs. — No. 2 of five copies

Top secret

Directive No. 11

1. The course of the offensive up to now shows that the enemy failed to recognize in time the basic principle of our operations. He continues to throw strong forces against the Namur-Antwerp line and appears to be neglecting the sector in front of Army Group A.

2. This situation and the quick forcing of the Meuse crossings in the sector of Army Group A have given us the first prerequisite for achieving a great success through a push by very strong concentrated forces north of the Aisne toward the northeast, as set forth in Directive No. 10. In this the mission of the forces fighting north of the Liege-Namur line is to deceive and tie down, with the forces they now have, the greatest possible number of enemy forces.

3. On the northern flank the Dutch army has shown greater power of resistance than was expected. Political as well as military considerations require that this resistance be speedily broken. It is the

Army's task to bring about the quick collapse of "Fortress Holland" by a sufficiently strong offensive from the south in conjunction with the attack from the east.

4. All available motorized divisions are to be transferred as quickly as possible into the operations zone of Army Group A.

The armored and motorized divisions of Army Group B are also to be disengaged as soon as there are no further operational possibilities there, and when the situation permits they are to be directed into the left attacking wing.

5. The mission of the Air Force is to concentrate strong offensive and defensive forces, with the focal point at Army Group A, in order to prevent the enemy from bringing up additional forces against the attacking front, and in order to support the latter directly.

Furthermore the Air Force is to facilitate the quick conquest of "Fortress Holland", utilizing forces hitherto operating in front of the 6th Army.

6. The Navy will operate against sea communications in the Hoofden and in the Channel as the opportunity arises.

signed: Adolf Hitler

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 33 028/40 g.K.Chefs.

Headquarters, 24 May 1940

No. 3 of seven copies

Top secret

Directive No. 13

1. The next operational objective is to destroy the French, British, and Belgian forces encircled in Artois and Flanders through a concentric attack by our northern wing and to seize quickly and secure the Channel coast there.

The mission of the Air Force in this connection is to break down all resistance of the surrounded enemy forces, to prevent the escape of the British forces across the Channel, and to secure the southern flank of Army Group A.

The war against the enemy air force is to be continued at every favorable opportunity.

2. The operation of the Army aimed at the destruction of enemy forces

in France, which is to follow in the shortest possible time, is to be prepared in three sectors as follows:

1st sector: An advance between the ocean and the Oise to the lower Seine below Paris, with the purpose of accompanying and securing, with weak forces, the later main operation at the right flank.

If the situation and available reserves permit, it will be desirable, even before the fighting is over in Artois and Flanders, to capture the area between the Somme and the Oise by means of a concentric offensive in the direction of Montdidier, and thus to prepare and facilitate the later advance to the lower Seine.

2nd sector: An offensive with the bulk of the Army, including strong armored and motorized forces, by-passing Rheims on both sides while moving southeastward, with the mission of defeating the bulk of the French army in the Paris-Metz-Belfort triangle and of bringing about the collapse of the Maginot line.

3rd sector: A well-timed secondary operation, supplementary to this main one and aimed at piercing the Maginot line at its weakest point, between St. Avold and Sarreguemines, in the direction of Nancy-Luneville, with comparatively weak forces.

Furthermore, an attack across the Upper Rhine may be considered also, depending upon the development of the situation, with the limitation that no more than 8 to 10 divisions are to be employed.

3. Mission of the Air Force:

a. Independent of the operations in France, the Air Force will be given unlimited freedom of action against the British homeland as soon as sufficient forces are available. This operation is to be started with a crushing attack in retaliation for the British raids on the Ruhr area.

Targets will be decided upon by the Commander in Chief, Air Force, in conformity with the principles laid down in Directive No. 9 and the supplementary regulations which are to be issued by the Armed Forces High Command. The exact time and the intended strategy are to be reported to me.

The air war against the British homeland is to be continued even after the Army's operations begin.

b. When the main operations of the Army in the direction of Rheims begin, it will be the duty of the Air Force, besides maintaining air superiority, to support the attack directly, to break up newly arrived enemy formations, to prevent any re-grouping, and especially to protect the western flank of the front.

The Air Force is also to cooperate in the break-through at the Maginot line, as far as necessary.

c. Furthermore, the Commander in Chief, Air Force is to examine what measures are necessary to improve the air defense of the regions most heavily attacked by the enemy, by utilizing additional forces from territories less endangered hitherto.

Insofar as this involves interests of the Navy, the Commander in Chief, Navy will participate.

4. Duties of the Navy:

The Navy hereby receives permission for all-out naval warfare in the waters around the British Isles and along the French coast; the restrictions which have prevailed up to now are canceled.

The Commander in Chief, Navy will submit a proposal for the delimitation of the sea areas in which the measures which have been released for the blockade will be employed.

I reserve the decision whether the blockade will be made public; and if so in what form it will appear.

5. The Commanders in Chief are requested to submit to me, in person or in writing, their plans based upon this directive.

signed: Adolf Hitler

Armed Forces High Command

WFA/Abt. L Nr. 33038/40 g.K.Chefs.

Fuehrer Headquarters
26 May 1940
No. 2 of twelve copies

Reference: OKW/WFA Abt. L Nr. 215/39 g.K.Chefs.

Subject: Guiding principles for warfare against the enemy's economy

Top secret
Supplement to Directive No. 9

The foundations for warfare against the economy of the enemy have been decidedly improved by the occupation of Norway and the Netherlands, as well as by the imminent conclusion of operations in Belgium and northern France. Strong formations, however, especially those of the Air Force, will not be ready for this task until a later date.

Therefore the following supplement to the guiding principles already published should apply, in the main, to additional preparations:

1. The results to date of warfare against the economy of the enemy are as follows:

a. The loss of Scandinavia, Belgium and the Netherlands as supply bases has increased the enemy's need for deep-sea tonnage. On the other hand, however, Britain has gained a valuable increase in shipping space from the merchant fleets of the occupied countries.

b. Both Britain and France have been compelled to introduce